

PAUL CANTOR ON HAMLET • WALKER PERCY ON BOURBON

Claremont Review OF BOOKS

Volume II • Number 1 • Fall 2001

A Journal of Political Thought and Statesmanship



VICTORY

WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO WIN

BY ANGELO M. CODEVILLA

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Why We Fight

BY CHARLES R. KESLER

When "war is forced upon us," said Douglas MacArthur in his speech to a joint session of Congress in 1951, "there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory — not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory."

With becoming eloquence, President George W. Bush has promised Americans that the terrorists will be brought to justice and that "the evildoers" worldwide will be defeated. Although they began this war on their terms, it will end, he assures us, on our terms and in a moment and manner that we shall dictate. Yet he has said very little about victory. What will be the shape of our victory?

After all, it is one thing to say that the war will end only when we say so. It is quite another to declare that it will end only when we have won. Though the war in Afghanistan goes well, President Bush admits that Afghanistan is but a single theater of this conflict, and not the decisive one, at that. So even as the fighting rages, the American mind turns naturally to the next question: What comes *after* Afghanistan? What actions would be decisive in this war? How shall we know when or if we have won?

These are not impertinent questions. On the contrary, these are strategic questions that must be answered if the American people are ultimately to have confidence in the war and in this administration. I don't doubt that

President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and other gallant figures in the government intend to open a second and perhaps even a third theater of war after settling matters in Afghanistan. But many of our allies, not to mention U.S. congressmen and high-level administration officials, will oppose further measures. In fact, the more decisive the measures threaten to be, the more they will be opposed.

So as our initial contribution to the war effort, the *Claremont Review of Books* is proud to publish Angelo Codevilla's powerful, trenchant essay on what it will take to win this war against terrorism. Codevilla's reasoning is of the impatient Hamiltonian sort, familiar to all readers of *The Federalist*: who wills the ends must also will the means. *Got it?* A seasoned Washington veteran who now teaches international relations and political science at Boston University, he has a style that might be called take-no-prisoners, except that that would be an insult to his refined conscience and natural-law learning.

Who will win us this victory over our new enemies? The armed forces of the United States, that's who, but as Jean Yarbrough and Mac Owens explain, all is not well with our military. The aftereffects of Vietnam linger, sometimes in paradoxical ways. Even generals and presidents are caught up in them, as Owens recounts. All the while, contemporary society regards the military with a mixture of hostility, wonder, and indifference. Invited to address the cadets at West Point on the occasion of that institution's bicentennial, Yarbrough excogitated with a historical and philosophical guide to the American military's ethos, to its distinctive virtues and their place in our republican way of life. The *CRB* offers an excerpt,

which argues that despite the tensions between military and civilian life, there is cause for gratitude.

THE TERM "TERRORIST" COMES, APPROPRIATELY enough, from the French Revolution. That phase of the French Revolution known as "The Terror" does not, it turns out, carry an invidious label imposed on it by contemporaneous or later enemies. "Terror" was a kind of slogan of the Robespierre faction, and the words *terrorisme* and *terroriste* probably originated as proud self-descriptions. Edmund Burke was the first or at any rate among the first to use the term in English, as a pejorative, of course. Harvey C. Mansfield takes off from this fact in his dazzling exposition of terror's significance in modern political thought.

Another writer, Osama bin Laden, address unknown, contributes his infamous *fatwa* proclaiming that individual Muslims everywhere have a duty to kill Americans anywhere. The indiscriminate murder of men, women, and children, soldiers and civilians, called for by bin Laden is irrefutable proof that our war is a just war. Of such an enemy it is hard to tell, as Professor Mansfield observes, where the religious fanaticism leaves off and the nihilism begins. As additional evidence on this question, the *CRB* offers an eye-opening essay on the "72 black-eyed virgins," allegedly promised to Muslim martyrs in Paradise as a reward for their earthly sacrifice.

After exploring these and the many other delights of this issue, gentle reader, you may need a drink, or at least to read about a drink, and so we gladly serve up Walker Percy's memorable essay on bourbon. Drinking bourbon is one of those civilized pleasures that our enemies (and to be sure, some of our friends) deny themselves. All the more reason to enjoy it, we say. In moderation, of course.

Happy holidays.

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REVIEWS & ESSAYS



The Return of Public Seriousness

BY ANDREW E. BUSCH

THE INITIAL REACTION OF MANY Americans to the terrorist attack of September 11 was disbelief. The images of destruction seemed surreal, like an action movie utilizing state-of-the-art special effects.

In fact, the events of that terrible day represented a heavy dose of reality that has shaken American politics — and, indeed, American life — to the core. Three elements of reality stand out clearly amid the smoke and ruins.

First, evil does exist in the world. Despite the desperate attempts of Stanley Fish and others to deny it, radical rela-

tivism can offer no insight into our current crisis. Postmodernism has run smack dab into original sin, and original sin has won. The therapeutic view of life — that there are no bad people, only poor choices — has been exposed as hollow and unsatisfactory, too, as has multiculturalism, or the view that there are no moral grounds to prefer one culture over another (and certainly no grounds to prefer our own).

Second, mortality cannot be evaded. During the Cold War, the stench of mortality hung in the air. In the 1990s, Americans came to enjoy a more carefree existence. No one doubted that death would come to us all, but few felt it necessary to live every day as if it might be

their last. Death has now returned in all its rigor, not as a benign end to a comfortable life but as most of the human race has always known it, as a force of violence and caprice. Americans have taken to wondering if we will ever get back to “normal.” Unfortunately, insecurity, war, and fear of violent death are normal. It is the unprecedented complacency of recent years that was abnormal. In any event, the smiley face is out; Heironymous Bosch is back.

Third, the safety of our country cannot be taken for granted. Unmentioned behind declamations that we had “lost our innocence” lay the fact that for much of American history our safety had not been

assured. The British occupied nearly every major colonial city during the Revolution, then in the War of 1812 attacked Baltimore, New Orleans, and Washington D.C., burning the White House and driving the President and First Lady from the capital. From 1861-65, neither North nor South was safe from military invasion by the other. At Pearl Harbor, a devastating sneak attack propelled the U.S. into World War II. During the Cold War, Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs demonstrated that America was not immune to subversion from within, even as Soviet missiles showed our vulnerability to nuclear obliteration. In this sense as well, the 1990s were not normal; they were a blessed interlude from what is normal. On September 11, we were reminded that our national security must be earned anew by every generation.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THESE THREE realizations are far-reaching. Not least, this unwelcome return of reality has forced Americans to reevaluate what is truly important in life. Religion, patriotism, and family have each been

embraced more ardently than before. While these changes are not overtly ideological or partisan, if they endure, they bode well for the future of conservatism; or, at any rate, they bode ill for opponents of conservatism. Few forces in America provide a more serious obstacle to the radical Left than the triumvirate of faith, family, and flag. This is, of course, precisely why the Left has traditionally devoted such energy to undermining them.

Other political consequences have been felt as well. Take, for example, the following issues:

Gun Control. After September 11, it is hard to argue that society is safer as long as law-abiding citizens are disarmed. On the contrary, the airliners were vulnerable precisely because the terrorists, though vastly outnumbered, were the only armed people on the plane. The subsequent demand by the Airline Pilots Association to be allowed to carry firearms is recognition of that fact. Indeed, we are now facing a multi-front war, one front of which consists of irregular military forces infiltrated into America for the purpose of carrying out sabotage and creating mayhem at points of social vulnerability, precisely where there is not a military or police presence. This situation makes an armed citizenry essential for national self-defense, giving new currency to Madison's remark in *The Federalist* commending "the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation." By contrast, gun control advocates who ridicule the notion that private gun ownership might be useful in resisting foreign enemies are now the ones who sound ridiculous. The gun-control debate will never be the same, in the air or on the ground.

Immigration. Talk of blanket immunity for illegal aliens in the United States is dead. Instead, Congress will likely tighten immigration controls, making it harder for foreign nationals to get into the U.S. and easier to deport them once they're here. Pressure will be intense on the Immigration and Naturalization Service to screen visa applications more carefully and to follow up on students and others whose visas have expired. Likewise, amid concerns that American Muslims have been relatively muted in their condemnation of terror and their support for the war, Americans seem suddenly more interested in how to assimilate immigrants into American political culture and ensure their loyalty.

"Affirmative Action." The Bush Administration, which last summer announced it would argue for continuation of racial set-asides in government construction contracts, has now dropped Justice Department support for a lawsuit alleging that a big-city fire department was biased against women because its entry test required a standard of physical strength most female applicants couldn't meet. This decision elicited barely a peep

KNOW YOUR ENEMY

AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION AND insight into contemporary terrorism, the Claremont Review of Books presents these excerpts from the *fatwa* announced in February 1998 by Osama Bin Laden. The document was translated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

* * *

Praise be to God, who revealed the Book, controls the clouds, defeats factionalism, and says in His Book: "But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)."

The Arabian Peninsula has never — since God made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it with seas—been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations. All this is happening at a time in which nations are attacking Muslims. In the light of the grave situation and the lack of support, we are obliged to discuss current events, and we should all agree on how to settle the matter.

No one argues today about three facts that are known to everyone:

First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.

Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million...despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation.

Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there.

All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims. On that basis, and in compliance with God's order, we issue the following *fatwa** to all Muslims:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies — civilians and military — is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God.

*We — with God's help — call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulama**, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.*

Almighty God also says: "O ye who believe, what is the matter with you, that when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of God, ye cling so heavily to the earth! Do you prefer the life of this world to the hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the hereafter. Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least. For God hath power over all things."

* A legal opinion or decree handed down by an Islamic religious leader

** A body of mullahs, or educated Muslims trained in traditional religious law and doctrine and usually holding an official post

of protest, even from hard-core feminists. Every other American who works or lives above the second floor instantly understood the stakes. Public safety has always been a matter of life or death. It has always been more important that satisfying the ideological predilections of the National Organization of Women. But because NOW paid more attention than the average American, who simply assumed that safe-

ty came first, NOW often won. No longer.

"Racial Profiling." Amazingly, a recent poll found that 71 percent of black Americans now support racial profiling in law enforcement — for Middle Easterners. It was only last year that profiling was the punching bag of candidates everywhere. Democrat Bill Bradley condemned Al Gore for not demanding that Bill Clinton end profiling with an executive order; Gore

condemned Bradley for being from New Jersey, where profiling began. George W. Bush promised to look into the issue and correct injustice. Now, a significant number of American opinion leaders is openly arguing that if a particular type of criminal activity is carried out disproportionately by a particular type of person, extra scrutiny of persons who fit the description might reflect prudence rather than prejudice. This debate, too, has changed fundamentally.

In each case, before September 11, wishful thinking and utopian ideology dominated the discussion. Since September 11, ideological obsessions have taken a back seat to the dictates of reality. In many respects, leftism is the natural home of dilettantism, the empty posturing that disdains rigorous consideration of practical consequences. It has suddenly become much more difficult to be a dilettante.

WHILE THE LEFT HAS SUFFERED damage, there are ways in which some arguments on the Right have also lost their force.

Perhaps the best example is term limits, which many (though by no means all) conservatives embraced in the 1990s. The unspoken, and perhaps unconscious, assumption behind term limits was that no future crisis would be serious enough to require continuity of government. The travails of New York City, forced by term limits to surrender the services of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani at its moment of maximum need, must cast serious doubt on that assumption. Indeed, the biggest constitutional question facing Congress today is not how to make members leave, but what to do if so many members are killed in a terrorist attack that Congress cannot function. Alexander Hamilton anticipated the potential for danger in term limits when in *The Federalist* he condemned the "ill effect" of "banishing men from stations in which, in certain emergencies of the State, their presence might be of the greatest moment to the public interest or safety." We can now see what he meant.

None of this is to say that things cannot dramatically change again. A string of military or diplomatic reverses might undo the revival of patriotism, sowing malaise, dissent, and division in its place. Americans' return to religion might be short-lived, and might give way to greater hostility as the media and pop-cultural elite equates conservative Christians with the Taliban. For the time being, though, the prospect of a hanging has powerfully concentrated our minds. Death is back among us. Seriousness has followed in its train.

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Andrew E. Busch is associate professor of political science at the University of Denver. Portions of this article first appeared on the website of the Ashbrook Center for Public Policy (www.ashbrook.org).

'Those Hell-Hounds Called Terrorists'


BY HARVEY C. MANSFIELD

THESE ARE THE WORDS OF EDMUND Burke, referring to a corps of irregulars used to enforce the tyranny of the French Revolution. I hope I will not be drafted into the "blame America" crowd if I briefly expound on the place of terror in the tradition of modern political thought in the West. Then we can compare the terror we know from our philosophers with the terror from Islamic radicals that we have lately experienced.

Aristotle speaks of terror used by tyrants to maintain their rule, but he rejects it because he rejects tyranny. Terror is directed against the notable and high-minded of the tyrant's subjects; with terror, the tyrant eliminates these dangerous potential foes and keeps the people modest and submissive. It was Machiavelli, a modern writer, who picked up this tyrant's weapon and made it an instrument of all government, including republican government. He recommended the practice of cruelty as long as it was "well-used," but he suggested too that the infinite cruelty of Hannibal was a virtue. While individual killings might be represented as punishment for crimes, Machiavelli went so far as to propose killing all the gentlemen in a republic so as to make it governable. As with Aristotle, terror is essentially anti-aristocratic. It is used against the honorable, who do not fear death, or fear it less, in order to impress the multitude, who do fear it and take satisfaction in the elimination of those who pretend to be above them.

Thomas Hobbes founded a philosophy of rights on the timorous character of the multitude, making it universal in a "state of nature" where everyone would be in fear. John Locke, the founder of liberalism, continued Hobbes's reliance on a fearful state of nature and the right of self-preservation. To a degree, therefore, modern political philosophy is implicated in the terror that was adopted as deliberate state policy by the French Republic when the Convention declared the Terror to be the order of the day on September 5, 1793. Here the tyrant's recourse for saving himself becomes the republic's chosen policy of killing its enemies, potential or actual.

To Burke the policy of terror revealed the principal feature of the French Revolution, its fanatical atheism. Religion can be the cause of fanaticism ("enthusiasm" in the eighteenth-century sense), he admitted. But so too, the world learned then for the first time, could atheism. The Revolution's philosophers taught its



politicians an atheistic doctrine that they used to consolidate their power at home and expand it abroad. Conscience was deposed from its dominion over the mind, and the dreadful maxim of Machiavelli — never to be wicked by halves in great affairs — was put in its stead.

The revolutionary politicians hardened their hearts against their victims because their humanitarian goals gave them license to look far into the future for the benefits of their theories, beyond the horizon of the present in which people actually live. To arrive at the future, Burke argued, these politicians felt justified in despising men's natural affections, in denying them the consolations of religion, and in depriving them of their prop-

erty. Behind the revolutionary terrorists Burke sees aggressive modern secularism, and he compares their leaders to Mohammed and their movement to the Protestant Reformation.

TO SUM UP: OUR MODERN POLITICAL philosophy has experimented, to say the least, with the manipulation of fear. Although Burke decried the Terror in the French Revolution, G. W. F. Hegel, who followed him, justified it as a stage of the learning process of Absolute (or unrestrained) Freedom, as if this historical event were a stratagem that could have been adopted by a rational God. Moreover, the reliance of Hobbes and Locke on the right of life, understood as

the priority of self-preservation, makes government responsible for security rather than for virtue. Security is easy to define and attainable, virtue is hard to define and unattainable. But a people primed for security and given to fear for self-preservation is subject to the frequent alarms of insecurity and thus particularly vulnerable to terrorism. The peace in which it lives, sustained by routine instead of virtue, is easy to disrupt.

So, apparently, the Islamic radicals believe. They fasten on the modern respect for life, which they dismiss contemptuously as a cowardly clinging to life. Just as they use our technology against us, making weapons of our commercial airplanes, so too they make our principles contradict themselves, our very desire for security driving us into insecurity.

Like Burke, the Islamic radicals oppose modern secularism, but unlike him, they do not do so in the name of modern freedom. What they want is not clear. Do they desire to return to a pre-modern life of piety and obedience to law removed from the temptations that modern technology puts in the way? Or is there something still more sinister in their seething hearts smacking of modernity in its latest, most destructive totalitarian phase, a hatred of peace, comfort, security and the pursuit of happiness? To bear out the latter possibility, one sees in their religion truly ferocious anger against modern democracy, endorsed, they believe, by Allah and the Prophet, as if the purpose of divinity were to intensify human passions to their utmost and to turn mankind against itself in an endless war that rewards murderers in the next life with a vulgar bliss only murderers would enjoy.

To defend ourselves, we could take another look at Burke. Burke stands for the dominion of conscience over the mind, which is not a refusal to think but an unwillingness to abandon scruple. And, lest conscience make cowards of us all, he combines it with a manly freedom, which replaces the right of self-preservation and promises to keep democracy powerful and brave. I think I see an impromptu instance of that freedom in the passengers on United flight 93 who conquered their fear and resisted their murderers. That story deserves to go into every future American civics textbook, if it can be verified — or even if it cannot.

Harvey C. Mansfield is William R. Kenan, Jr. professor of government at Harvard University.

REVIEWS & ESSAYS

BY JEAN M. YARBROUGH

IN THE BEST OF ALL WORLDS, THOMAS Jefferson once wrote, Americans would have nothing to do with other nations. Yet, he knew that war would “sometimes,” maybe even frequently, “be our lot; and all the wise can do, will be to avoid that half of them which would be produced by our own follies, and our own acts of injustice; and to make for the other half the best preparations we can.”

As President, Jefferson’s record on war “preparations” was mixed. His republican concern with frugality led him — disastrously — to downsize the navy, even as he continued to promote international trade. In pursuing so contradictory a policy, he left American citizens and ships vulnerable to foreign attacks and imperiled the very honor and justice he sought to defend.

But this was nothing compared to his deep and abiding distrust of a standing army. Part of his opposition stemmed from in the conduct of British troops in the years leading up to the Revolution. Even after the redcoats had been vanquished, however, Jefferson remained faithful to the classic Whig doctrine that viewed standing armies as a danger to republican liberty and as nursery for despotism. In Europe, where nobles could buy military commissions, army officers were too closely tied to the aristocracy, and Jefferson feared (wrongly, it turned out) that the well-born army officers who fought for independence might also be tempted to betray the Revolution. He saw conspiracies everywhere.

Thus, it comes as some surprise that only a year after taking office, Jefferson, with the backing of the first Republican Congress, signed into law a bill establishing a national military academy on the grounds of the old garrison at West Point, in Alexander Hamilton’s New York. His reasons were both political and scientific. Whatever Jefferson may have meant when he declared in his First Inaugural that “We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists,” he most assuredly did *not* mean that officers loyal to Hamilton and, in his view, secretly favoring aristocracy and monarchy, should remain at the head of the armed forces. The establishment of West Point solved the problem of where this new corps of army officers might come from. As a man of the Enlightenment, Jefferson hoped he could use the academy to promote science, the exploration of the west, and other less martial projects. In much the same way that he would later establish the University of Virginia to weed out “political heresy” and keep alive “the vestal flame of republicanism,” he now saw the advantages of a national military academy run by Republicans, which would take promising young men from modest backgrounds — those natural *aristoi* whose loyalty and honor he could count on — and train them to become the next generation of officers for the army and the militia.

Today, our problems are almost the reverse. The sons and daughters of our political and cul-



Duty, Honor, Country On the Importance of the Military Virtues in Preserving our Republican Institutions

tural elites are breaking down the doors to get into the most competitive liberal arts colleges and universities, and it is the rare 18-year-old from our so-called aristocracy who considers applying to the service academies. Of course, the service academies suffer no shortage of talent; they are filled with Jefferson’s natural aristocrats, along with the children of former graduates and military officers. But the “trust-fund babies” and children of our civilian elites are elsewhere. We don’t have to force our most privileged classes out of the officer corps; they wouldn’t be caught dead in it.

These students — also idealistic and eager to serve their country — enroll in law schools and public policy programs. They seek careers in Washington where they can “make a difference.” Just as they didn’t consider the service academies when they were looking at colleges, they don’t consider military service after graduation. The world of our elite colleges and universities and the world of our military academies run along parallel tracks, destined never to meet.

It is only because the present Bush Administration has drawn so many of its top officials from the ranks of the unsung ’50s generation that this problem has temporarily been overcome. All we need do, however, is recall the Clinton Administration, where nei-

ther the President nor his Secretary of Defense, nor his Secretary of State, ever served in the military. As former Secretary of the Navy James Webb noted, “The greatest lingering effect of the Vietnam era on our society is that by default it brought a new notion that military service during time of war is not a prerequisite for moral authority or even respect.” And this is dangerous because it erects too solid a wall between our military and civilian cultures, and makes the virtues of each seem foreign to the other. We need to find a way to get more of our best young men and women to think about military service and officer training. As things stand now, the children of the most privileged are largely AWOL.

OF COURSE, TO ACHIEVE THIS KIND OF cultural cross-fertilization between the civilian and military worlds, we need to think about more than just the role of West Point and the service academies. Not everyone is cut out to live the life of a combat officer. And this is especially true in the kind of commercial republic the Framers established. America is not Sparta or Rome. But it would be a good thing for both the military and the broader civilian society if more of our young people had at least some minimal experience of the rigors of military life, and some first-

hand appreciation of its distinctive virtues.

One way to achieve this is to return ROTC to our elite campuses, from which it was ingloriously evicted during the Vietnam years. As the *Wall Street Journal* recently reported, at the beginning of the 1990s, these institutions would not even permit military recruiters on campus, arguing that the military’s policy of “don’t ask, don’t tell,” violated their moral commitment not to discriminate on the basis of sexual preference. Instead, the elite universities imposed their own version of “don’t ask, don’t tell”: interested students had to meet with recruiters at designated off-campus sites. Beginning in 1994, Congress began to retaliate, insisting that these institutions must either permit recruiters on campus or risk losing their federal funds. But they have come around only grudgingly, letting students know that acquiescence is by no means approval.

This is the climate in which the current debate over ROTC is taking place. At the moment, among the Ivies, only Cornell has ROTC units of all three service branches on campus. Princeton offers only army ROTC; Penn, navy ROTC; Harvard and Yale, along with Columbia and Brown, offer programs with exercises conducted at other institutions, imposing considerable burdens on the students enrolled in these programs. The so-called conservative Ivy, Dartmouth, offers no ROTC programs either on or off campus. If anything, the situation is even worse at the top liberal arts colleges, where there are not only no ROTC programs (with the conspicuous exception of Claremont McKenna College), but there are not even debates about whether to bring it back.

What the presence of ROTC programs on college campuses did was to help bridge the gap between the military and civilian worlds, much as Jefferson thought the militia might do. (In fact, here too, ROTC seems another reversal of what Jefferson intended. Rather than West Point graduates returning to lead their militia units, civilian-educated officers serve limited tours of duty in the active army.) Of course, there are the inevitable tensions between the graduates of the academies and the officers coming out of the ROTC programs, between the combat professionals and those fulfilling their short-term military obligations, but on the whole, this kind of leavening is good for the officer corps, and good for the country. This kind of cross-fertilization is still going on, but without the participation of our political and cultural elites.

Yet even if we could finally manage with the present war on terrorism to put an end to the debilitating “Vietnam syndrome” that has gripped our educated classes and opinion makers for the last thirty years, I do not mean to suggest that we could ever completely overcome the tension between the civilian and military cultures. And here again, our situation seems to be the reverse of the problem Jefferson faced. Jefferson worried about a mil-

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REVIEWS & ESSAYS

DUTY

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itary culture that did not reflect the values and virtues of the larger republican society. Of course, there are critics of the military who believe that that is still the problem with our armed forces today. But I think the problem is that our military has been pushed too hard — often by politicians with no military experience — to reflect the values of the broader civilian culture. As one critic observes, whenever people talk about the need to close the gap between the civilian and military cultures, what they mean is that the military must give way. Now, in one sense this is right and proper, for military authority is constitutionally subordinate to civilian authority. But in another sense, it is wrong and dangerous, because it imperils the distinct mission of the armed forces.

The military cannot and should not try to mirror exactly the principles of democratic society. The military is not a "civic instrument" that reflects social progress. Nor is it a social welfare agency. The relationship between the military and civilian spheres is more complicated. Although the military defends the principles of democratic society, it cannot fully embody them. Its end is victory, not liberty; its virtues are courage, loyalty, and obedience, not justice and tolerance; its structure is hierarchical, not pluralistic and open-ended. In short, although the military defends democratic principles and is inevitably shaped by the regime of

which it is a part, it is not, and should not try to be a microcosm of the larger society. And if this is true when the civilian culture is strong and healthy, it is even more so when the larger culture has grown soft and corrupt. To try to bring the military into closer alignment with such a culture is especially corrosive since it undermines the distinctive virtues of military life while exposing it to all the vices of civilian life. Specifically, the more West Point seeks to emulate the ethos of these institutions, the more it will wind up with the same problems: cheating, drugs, sex scandals, and the like.

At the most theoretical level this means that we need to recognize that the service academies and our leading colleges and universities will nurture and develop different parts of the human soul. West Point will speak to the spirited part of the soul — the part that is roused by anger and righteous indignation to fight for the higher principles to which America is dedicated. It will elevate honor and subordinate self-interest, even the interest in self-preservation. What spiritedness seeks to preserve is not the life of the individual soldier, but a way of life, and in accepting this duty, it is bound back to the sacrifices of warriors gone before: "The Long Gray Line." Spiritedness operates in the grand tragic-heroic mode.

In theory, our liberal arts colleges and universities seek to encourage the love of knowledge, wisdom, and beauty for their own sakes. At their best, they seek to awak-

en the deepest longings of the soul, though in practice these days they usually succeed only in stimulating the desires of the body. When genuine liberal learning takes place, it calls forth a certain playfulness that is more closely akin to comedy. Often, however, it operates at the level of farce.

At a more practical level this means that the kind of education West Point cadets receive should differ from that of our leading liberal arts colleges and universities. To be sure, there is a place for the humanities and fine arts at West Point, but these subjects should be taught in such a way as to reinforce the kind of heroic character and military virtues that the Academy wishes to promote. It must strive to reinforce a shared understanding of duty, honor, and country among its members, and to unite the present corps of cadets with the principles and ideals of previous generations.

The heart of the West Point education must focus on those subjects that bear most directly on its central mission, which is to prepare its officers for combat leadership. From the beginning, this has meant an emphasis on math and science on the one hand and the combat arts on the other. And within the military world a great battle rages over what should be the proper mix of these elements. However this issue is resolved — and we should note that the

tension between the scientific and the warrior spirit goes back to the days of Jefferson — West Point can never be just another college. Its mission, in the words of Douglas MacArthur, "remains fixed, determined, inviolable — it is to win our wars." Inevitably, this education produces a different kind of character. Dealing with matters of life and death, with honor, duty, and courage, military men and women may grasp this more instinctively than we civilians do. In the coming months and years, you will be called upon to protect us from a new and more deadly round of barbaric assaults. And in what may be the ultimate Jeffersonian irony, it may well be the military officers — along with their civilian counterparts — who lead us as a nation back to the republican virtues of patriotism, courage, and steadfastness. Because these are the virtues West Point has always sought to instill in its officers, the days ahead, whatever the hardships, will be better days for you. And they will be better days for America because of you.

Jean M. Yarbrough is Gary M. Pandy, Sr. Professor of Social Sciences at Bowdoin College and author of *American Virtues: Thomas Jefferson on the Character of a Free People* (University Press of Kansas). This article is adapted from a speech delivered at a conference at West Point in honor of its bicentennial in November 2001.

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Tried to Steal
the Election*

Friends & Enemies

BY MACKUBIN THOMAS OWENS

Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Conflict, by General Wesley K. Clark. Public Affairs, 479 pages, \$30

LEADING A COALITION IN WAR IS A NOTORIOUSLY difficult enterprise. As Winston Churchill wrote in *The Hinge of Fate*, "In war, it is not always possible to have everything go as one likes. In working with allies, it sometimes happens that they develop opinions of their own." Napoleon Bonaparte expressed a preference for fighting alone against a coalition. "The allies we gain by victory will turn against us upon the bare whisper of our defeat."


Waging Modern War by retired U.S. Army General Wesley Clark is a fascinating account of coalition warfare: NATO's 1999 war against Yugoslavia in Kosovo. In this, NATO's first war, Clark ostensibly controlled vast assets. In reality, so many conflicting forces — political, diplomatic, military, and legal — compromised his command that it's remarkable NATO was able to achieve anything resembling victory. This effort was against a militarily weak foe, leading one observer to question whether NATO would be able to maintain solidarity and combat effectiveness against a more equal opponent.

Clark, who was commander both of NATO and of U.S. forces in Europe, faced unprecedented problems in executing this war. The first and most important was that the members of NATO were unable to agree on the goals of the war, the strategy, and the extent of force that could be brought to bear against Slobodan Milosevic. NATO civilian leaders entered into the war expecting that it would end quickly — that Milosevic would be cowed by a few days of air strikes.

Second, the civilian leaders undercut the coercive potential of the military campaign by declaring at the outset how limited it would be. For instance, President Bill Clinton announced that NATO would not use ground forces, and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana stated that the air campaign would last only "days, not months."

Third, the influence of lawyers on the conduct of the war in Kosovo was unprecedented. Not only did Clark have to contend with the sort of civilian interference in military operations that characterized the Vietnam War, he and his subordinates had to have every target vetted by the lawyers. In this war, lawyers became *de facto* tactical commanders.

Finally, Clark had to deal with an administration that, for whatever reason, did not fully trust him and a military establishment that did not support him — indeed, arguably did what it could to undercut him. Clark was never invited to a strategy discussion with either the secretary of defense or the president. So bad was the relationship between Clark and his Washington counterparts that Defense Secretary William Cohen and Joint Chiefs



Chairman Hugh Shelton conspired to keep Clark away from the NATO summit meeting in Washington during the war. He attended anyway, but was ostracized by the president, Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Cohen and Shelton. As he approached their receiving line at a reception, several glanced at him. "Stay away" was the clear message from the body language," he writes. "It was jarring."

But there was more humiliation to come. After having presided over a victory of sorts in Kosovo, Clark was unceremoniously ousted from his command in order to make way for Air Force General Joseph Ralston.

Waging Modern War also reveals that, despite claims to the contrary, the Vietnam War continued to shape the way policy makers, both civilian and military, thought about foreign affairs during the 1990s.

To begin with, President Clinton was not interested in foreign affairs, preferring to focus on domestic politics. Unfortunately for Clinton and his legacy, events in the international arena did not cooperate. Almost from the start, Clinton found he could run but couldn't hide from events overseas. This forced him to focus on that part of his job in which he had the least interest and the least competence.

Clinton's foreign policy team was not the strongest in the history of the Republic — some have described it as the Carter administration's third string. Most of the civilian policy makers in the Clinton administration had cut their teeth in the anti-war movement of the 1960s. Yet over time, many became advocates of military intervention and the use of force to prevent human rights abuses.

For obvious reasons, the officer corps did not trust the Clinton foreign policy team. Even those too young to remember Vietnam thought that these "hawkish" civilians who were so

eager to involve them in conflicts abroad would abandon the military if the going got tough, leaving the soldiers to twist slowly in the wind.

THERE WAS ALSO A CULTURAL ASPECT TO this distrust. The officer corps as a whole tended to oppose the sort of "constabulary" operations that became so prevalent during the Clinton administration. The military in general and the Army in particular became casualty-averse during the 1990s, not wanting to lose soldiers in operations that they did not believe were in our vital national interest. As a result, the Army often dragged its feet in these kinds of operations. This foot dragging comes through loud and clear in *Waging Modern War*.

Indeed, all the contradictions of post-Cold War foreign and defense policy — pro-intervention activists among the civilians; reluctance on the part of the military, with the exception of the Air Force, which would be the featured actor in this operation — emerged during the war in Kosovo. On the one hand, the civilians wanted war on the cheap. Many civilians, both American and European, were reluctant to even call it a war.

On the other hand, the military was heavily influenced by the argument made by H.R. McMaster in his remarkable book on the origins of the Vietnam War, *Dereliction of Duty*. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, McMaster writes, acquiesced in the irresponsible decisions of the Johnson administration that led ultimately to defeat in Vietnam. As a result, the military was as culpable as Robert MacNamara's "Whiz Kids" in supporting a limited intervention in Vietnam that was bound to fail. Trying not to repeat that mistake, the military

dragged its feet in Kosovo and elsewhere, which made it impossible for the administration to follow a strategy based on the correct lessons of Vietnam, had it been so inclined.

As a result, the war in Kosovo was waged as if Vietnam had never taken place. Serbia could have been brought to its knees had the West been willing to employ decisive force at the outset. This lesson of Vietnam was driven home nearly two decades ago by the foremost American expert on Vietnamese communism, Douglas Pike, whose books *Viet Cong* and *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam*, are classics. In a paper delivered in 1983 at a Wilson Center symposium on Vietnam, Pike wrote that "the initial reaction of Hanoi's leaders to the strategic bombings and air strikes that began in February 1965 — documented later by defectors and other witnesses — was enormous dismay and apprehension. They feared the North was to be visited by intolerable destruction which it simply could not endure."

Based on interviews and intensive archival research, Pike concluded that "...while conditions had changed vastly in seven years, the dismaying conclusion to suggest itself from the 1972 Christmas bombing was that had this kind of air assault been launched in February of 1965, the Vietnam War as we know it might have been over within a matter of months, even weeks."

Clark himself refused to make the unambiguous choice for decisive force. He did not even raise objections to the European preference for cruise missile "drive-by shootings." In his view, if NATO countries "wanted to fire a few cruise missiles to make a political statement, did I have the right to say they couldn't?"

It is troubling to realize that the NATO approach almost failed against a fifth-rate military power. Clark makes it clear that the plan was just about to unravel when, for reasons that remain unclear, Milosevic threw in the towel.

We can only hope that the current administration has learned from the mistakes of its predecessor. So far in its war against the terrorists who executed the September 11 attack on the United States, the Bush administration, unlike the Clinton administration in Kosovo, has refused to take any capability off the table. That is a good sign. But other signs do not bode well for long-term American success. According to news reports, U.S. forces had an opportunity to kill Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, but military lawyers questioned the legality of the strike. He has since disappeared from sight.

Mackubin Thomas Owens is professor of strategy and force planning at the Naval War College in Rhode Island and an adjunct fellow of the Claremont Institute.

The Hitch With Hitchens

BY STEVEN HAYWARD

The Trial of Henry Kissinger, by Christopher Hitchens. Verso, 159 pages, \$22.00

FOR SOME TIME NOW IT HAS APPEARED that Christopher Hitchens, the acerbic critic for *The Nation* and other lefty publications, was on the slippery slope to becoming at least an adjunct member of the Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy. In addition to being one of Bill Clinton's most lacerating critics, Hitchens's public repudiation of Sidney Blumenthal over Clinton's actions in the Lewinsky cover-up probably ended Blumenthal's future prospects as a serious journalist — a high public service by any reckoning.

Hitchens has recently confessed to abandoning socialism and becoming more interested in libertarian ideas, admitting that Margaret Thatcher represented a more revolutionary force in British politics than the Labour Party. He has been prominent among figures on the Left who have reacted splendidly in the aftermath of September 11, attacking "Islamic fascism" and affirming the right as well as the duty of America to make war. But his greatest heresy from liberalism is one we hear least about. Hitchens opposes abortion on materialistic grounds: human life has to begin at some point, and there is no non-arbitrary way to determine that it begins at a point after conception but before birth. He still smokes tobacco products, and enjoys adult beverages.

Above all, Hitchens is a lively and stylish writer. He is never a bore, even when arguing a tendentious case, as he does with his recent book, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*. Hitchens delights in being an iconoclast, yet this book seems calculated to protect Hitchens' left flank from charges that he is a full-fledged defector. Few figures except the ghost of Joe McCarthy provoke the furies of the feverish Left more than Henry Kissinger, so this book should preserve Hitchens' club memberships on the Upper West Side.

There are many good reasons to be harshly critical of Kissinger's statecraft, some of which are on display in my own book, *The Age of Reagan*. Kissinger's precocious intellect is at the core of the problem. "The more history I read," Peter Drucker wrote in reflecting on Kissinger in 1978, "the more I become convinced



that the genius foreign minister is a disaster for his country." The conservative critique of Kissinger derives from the view that Kissinger's European-style realism is ill suited for American democracy, and that Kissinger's détente drained away the moral content of the American position in the Cold War. The leftist critique that Hitchens builds in *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* appears to be more straightforward: Kissinger is a war criminal who deserves a Nuremberg-style tribunal. "There is now no reason why a warrant for the trial of Henry Kissinger may not be issued, in any one of a number of jurisdictions," Hitchens writes, "and why he may not be compelled to answer it."

Hitchens' indictment includes charges of mass murder of civilians in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh, complicity in genocide in East Timor, and involvement in several murder conspiracies at home and abroad. Hitchens offers only a little new material or evidence for these affairs, instead relying on his powers as a stylist to recycle and sensationalize old episodes, starting with the "open secret" that Kissinger was a part of the Nixon cabal to derail Vietnamese peace negotiations on the eve of the 1968 election. Hitchens also retreads the sequel to this episode that has long been a staple of leftist lore — that Kissinger and Nixon eschewed the opportunity to conclude a peace agreement with North Vietnam in 1969, deliberately prolonging the war another five years and costing 20,000 more American lives.

The latter charge is nonsense; the former charge is probably true, though the full details remain murky. Moreover, the retailers of this charge fail to consider seriously some larger questions of politics

and statecraft lurking in the background. It is inconceivable that the crafty President Johnson was oblivious or uncalculating in agreeing to a bombing halt and negotiations on the very eve of a national election. Johnson aide John P. Roche had predicted early in 1967 that North Vietnam would agree to negotiations at the point where it would create the most mischief in American politics — close to the election. Perhaps Johnson, who had bugged Nixon's campaign, wanted to make mischief, in which case Nixon would be right to intervene in order to preserve some latitude for his own statecraft.

Any serious inquiry into these kind of murky affairs requires confronting the inherent moral ambiguity of international relations, especially in the context of a worldwide great-power confrontation. The unstated premise of Hitchens' categorical condemnation of Kissinger is that the Cold War, and its attendant practical dilemmas, was unnecessary. If Kissinger and the United States engaged in some unsavory acts that make us squeamish, we should keep in mind that the alternative in the 1970s was the sanctimonious statecraft of Jimmy Carter, the disastrous and lasting effects of which could be said to have persisted right up to September 11. It is doubtful that Afghanistan would be the chaotic rogue it is today if the Shah or his familial successors had survived as rulers of Iran, and had preserved it as a bastion for the West.

AT FIRST GLANCE THE RIGHT-WING and left-wing critiques of Kissinger appear symmetrical. Both are based on a moral complaint. But on closer inspection the similarity turns

out to be illusory. The leftist critique rests on a high-minded view that "reasons of state" cannot justify immoral means, even for moral ends, while in judging a nation's actions, most conservatives will place a priority on the essential justice of a regime and the threats it faces. As Churchill reminded us, "The Sermon on the Mount is the last word in Christian ethics ... Still, it is not on these terms that Ministers assume their responsibilities of guiding states."

This is one of the oldest debates in politics, made ever more acute by contemporary phenomena, from nuclear weapons to terrorism. It can always use fresh treatment, to help statesmen reflect on the prudence of statecraft. Rather than taking up the theoretical problem of the moral obligations and constraints of governments in foreign affairs, Hitchens sets his sights chiefly on overthrowing the privilege of sovereign immunity, and other incipient theories of international justice.

Of course, Hitchens may be putting us on; perhaps his swing to the Right has accelerated to warp speed. It is tempting to wonder whether Hitchens is merely leapfrogging all the way over to the fever swamps of the militia-right, where Kissinger has always been regarded as the chief water boy for the Rockefeller Trilateral Commission conspiracy. The serious clue will come from his next book, which is reportedly about George Orwell. Here Hitchens faces an even bigger challenge than with Kissinger. He no doubt sees himself as a successor to Orwell. Orwell saw clearly the depravity of the left, but could never put together a coherent alternative of his own. Being a brilliant critic is no mean achievement, but at the end of the day readers will want more, and have to turn elsewhere to find it.

Steven F. Hayward is senior fellow at the Pacific Research Institute in San Francisco, and author of *The Age of Reagan: The Fall of the Old Liberal Order, 1964-1980 (Prima)*.

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BY PATRICK J. GARRITY

ON SEPTEMBER 30, THE DEPARTMENT of Defense released its Quadrennial Defense Review, a congressionally mandated assessment of the U.S. defense posture timed to coincide with the advent of a new presidential administration.

The press and the public largely ignored the QDR — one of many studies generated each year by the national security bureaucracy — for the very good reason that an actual war was underway. Further, the document had essentially been completed before the events of September 11; only a hastily written and brief foreword by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dealt substantively with the Age of Terrorism. The QDR's central conclusions had been known and largely discounted by many defense experts over the summer. Rumsfeld and his key civilian aides had come into office determined to fulfill President Bush's campaign pledge to transform fundamentally the American military in response to new types of strategic threats. According to the common wisdom prior to the terrorist attacks, however, Rumsfeld's efforts had been derailed by congressional resistance to base closings and weapons cuts; the refusal of the White House to support sufficient increases in defense spending; and the reluctance of the uniformed military to move too far, too fast outside of familiar bureaucratic territory.

The undeniable result was a QDR heavy on analysis and virtually silent on actual decisions about which programs would be funded or eliminated. These hard decisions — those that matter most in Washington — were put off until future budget cycles. (In the Pentagon, the saying goes, serious people move money, everybody else moves paper.) And speculation grew that Rumsfeld and his team would not be around to make those choices.

Given all this, why should Americans now be interested in this piece of paper? In part, because White House and Congressional fiscal constraints on defense have been relaxed, at least for the present. Rumsfeld seems likely to stay long enough to move some of that new money. But more importantly, the QDR signals the first, tentative conceptual steps that will eventually guide U.S. military strategy beyond the current operations in Afghanistan. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, in thoughtful testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 4, insisted that the findings of the QDR anticipated in many ways the world now facing the United States. Wolfowitz drew the following lessons from the September 11 attacks.

• **Military history is full of surprises, and we must prepare ourselves for the virtual certainty that we will be surprised again.** Rumsfeld had made this point repeatedly prior to September 11. Adapting quickly and decisively to sur-



Preparing for the War After the 'War on Terrorism'

prise must therefore be a condition of planning. Future adversaries may employ even bolder forms of terrorism. These could include cyber attacks, advanced conventional weapons, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to strike at our people and our way of life. And we must not assume that terrorism is the new, predictable threat of the 21st century — to do so could leave us exposed to different challenges in the next decade. The next challenge may not be a terrorist attack at all, but something entirely different, even a return to the past practice of nation-states invading their neighbors.

• **The era of invulnerability is over.** War used to be something that took place on foreign soil. No longer. This threat will only grow worse in the coming years. The information revolution that is fueling the world economy is also putting dangerous

technologies into the hands of multiple adversaries. Along with the globalization that is creating interdependence among the world's free economies, there is a parallel globalization of terror, in which rogue states and terrorist organizations share information, intelligence, technology, weapons materials, and know-how. This technology will allow new adversaries to get past our Armed Forces and strike our territory without having to confront and defeat them.

• **Our adversary has changed.** In addition to the spread of more powerful weapons, we will also face new adversaries in the decades ahead — with different motivations and different capabilities. Our new adversaries may be, in some cases, more dangerous than those we faced in the past. They may not possess the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads capable of ending life on earth that the

Soviet Union did — but they may be more likely to use the increasingly powerful weapons in their possession. Their decision-making is not subject to the same constraints that earlier adversaries faced. Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong Il answer to no one. They may be less likely to be discouraged by traditional deterrence. What this means is that we need a new approach to deterrence for the 21st century.

• **The same thing unites our enemies today, as it did in the past: a desire to see America driven into retreat and isolation.** Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il and other such tyrants all want to see America out of critical regions of the world, constrained from coming to the aid of friends and allies, and unable to project power in the defense of our interests and ideals. This is why terrorist states harbor terrorist movements like al-Qaeda — these groups serve their ends. That is why the challenge today is greater than winning the war against terrorism. Today's terrorist threat is a precursor of even greater threats to come. It is no coincidence that the states harboring, financing and otherwise assisting terrorists, are also in many cases the same states that are aggressively working to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them.

IN THEIR POST-ATTACK COMMENTS, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz argued that the QDR did set the strategic direction and planning principles necessary to address these lessons. Most importantly, the QDR established homeland defense as the top Defense Department priority for the first time since the late 1930s — without however calling for an isolationist approach to national security policy or military strategy. Quite the contrary. The QDR also emphasizes the need to prepare for uncertainty and surprise; contend with asymmetric threats; develop new concepts of deterrence; replace a threat-based strategy with a capabilities-based strategy; and balance deliberately various dimensions of military risk.

Two of these elements seem particularly revealing of the mindset of the Bush administration's defense planners: deterrence and transformation.

The threats the United States faces in the 21st century will be multifaceted, and its deterrence strategy must be as well. According to the QDR, the U.S. needs a strategy of "layered deterrence" in which it develops a mix of capabilities, offensive and defensive, which can dissuade and deter a variety of emerging threats at different stages. The United States must dissuade potential adversaries from developing dangerous capabilities in the first place, by developing and deploying U.S. capabilities that reduce their incentives to compete. In the same way, the Department of Defense must develop a broad range of new capabilities that, by their very exist-

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COVER STORY

WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO WIN

BY ANGELO M. CODEVILLA

AS AMERICANS MOURNED ON the night of September 11, many in the Middle East celebrated. Their enemies, 280 million people disposing of one third the wealth of the earth, had been bloodied. Better yet, Americans were sadly telling each other that life would never be the same as before — and certainly not better.

The revelers' joy was troubled only by the fear that an angry America might crush them. For a few hours, Palestinian warlords referred to the events as *Al Nachba* — "the disaster" — and from Gaza to Baghdad the order spread that victory parties must be out of sight of cameras and that any inflammatory footage must be seized. But soon, to their relief, the revelers heard the American government announce that it would not hold them responsible. President George W. Bush gratuitously held out the cachet of "allies" in the war on terrorism to nations that the U.S. government had officially designated as the world's chief sponsors of terrorism. Thus Yasser Arafat's, Saddam Hussein's, and Bashar al Assad's regimes could enjoy, *undisturbed*, the success of the anti-Western cause that alone legitimizes their rule. That peace is their victory, and our lack of peace is our defeat.

Common sense does not mistake the difference between victory and defeat: the losers weep and cower, while the winners strut and rejoice. The losers have to change their ways, the winners feel more secure than ever in theirs. On September 12, retiring Texas Senator Phil Graham encapsulated this common sense: "I don't want to change the way I live. I want to change the way they live." Common sense says that victory means living without worry that some foreigners might kill us on behalf of their causes, but also without having to bow to domestic bureaucrats and cops, especially useless ones. It means not changing the tradition by which the government of the United States treats citizens as its masters rather than as potential enemies. Victory requires killing our enemies, or making them live in debilitating fear.

The flood of authoritative commentary

flowing from the U.S. government and the media soon washed common sense out of America's discourse. The conventional wisdom is foursquare in favor of the "War on Terrorism." But it defines that war in terms of an endless series of ever more sophisticated security measures at home; better intelligence for identifying terrorists; and military as well as economic measures to "bring to justice" the shadowy Al Qaeda network. Notably, this flood averts attention from the fact that sowing terror in order to get America to tie itself in rancorous knots is the principal element of several governments' foreign policy. It also discourages questioning the competence of the U.S. officials under whose guidance, in a single decade, America became the object in much of the world of a fateful combination of hatred and contempt. In short, the conventional wisdom envisages no effort to make mourners out of revelers and vice versa.

There will surely be more attacks, and of increasing seriousness. That is because the success of the September 11 attacks and of their aftermath has mightily encouraged America's enemies, and as we shall see, no security or intelligence measures imaginable stand any chance of diminishing the opportunities for successful terrorist attacks. Why should America's enemies stop doing what has proved safe, successful, and fun?

Let us first examine the attitudes and policies of the U.S. government that guarantee defeat — in fact, are defeat itself. Then we will be able to see more clearly what victory would look like, and how it could be achieved.

PART I: ANATOMY OF DEFEAT

The U.S. government's "War on Terrorism" has three parts: "Homeland Security," more intelligence, and bringing Al Qaeda "to justice." The first is impotent, counterproductive, and silly. The second is impossible. The third is misconceived and is a diversion from reality.

Security Is Illusory

The nationally televised statement on October 31 by Tom Ridge, President Bush's

head of Homeland Security, that the national "alert" and the new security measures would last "indefinitely," is a conclusive self-indictment. The Homeland Security office's vision of the future for ourselves and our children and our children's children involves identification cards for all, with biometric data and up-to-the-minute records of travel, employment, finances, etc., to be used to authorize access to places that are vulnerable to terrorist attack. This means that never again will the government simply trust citizens to go into a government office, a large building, a stadium, an airplane, or for that matter merely to walk around without what the Germans call *Ausweis* — papers. Checking everyone, however, makes sense only if officials will never be able to tell the difference between the average citizen and the enemy — and if the enemy will never be defeated.

But to assume such things is deadly. Unable to stop terrorists, Homeland Security will spend its time cracking down on those who run afoul of its regulations. In Chicago's O'Hare Airport, for example, a man was taken off an aircraft in handcuffs for having boarded before his row number had been called. Tom Ridge, with the demeanor of every state trooper who has ever pulled you over for exceeding 55 miles per hour, reassured Americans that he has the authority to order the shoot-down of civilian airliners. As Machiavelli points out in his *Discourses*, security measures that hurt, threaten, or humiliate citizens engender hatred on top of contempt. No civil libertarian, Machiavelli teaches that true security comes from armed citizens to whom the government is bound by mutual trust. America fought Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union without treating the public as potential enemies, and without making officials into a protected class. By governing from behind security screens, America's leaders today make our land less free and prove themselves less than brave.

Impotence worsens contempt. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli points out that no defense is possible against someone who is

willing to give up his life to kill another. In our time we have seen suicide gunners and bombers shred Israel's security system, surely the world's most extensive. Studies carried out by the CIA's Counterintelligence Center generalize the lesson: Whereas terrorist attacks against undefended targets have a rate of success limited only by the terrorists' incompetence, the rate of success against the most heavily defended targets hovers around 85%. In short, the cleverest, most oppressive defensive measures buy very little safety. In America, the possibilities for terrorist attack are endless, and effective security measures are inconceivable. How many school buses roll every morning? What would it take to toss a Molotov cocktail into 10 of them at precisely the same time? How easy would it be to sneak into a Safeway warehouse and contaminate a case of breakfast cereal? What would it take to set afire a gasoline tanker in





a U.S. port?

Security measures actually magnify the effects of terrorism. The hijackings of September 11 have set in motion security measures that shut down airports on receipt of threats or merely on the basis of technical glitches in the security system itself. Similarly, attacks on the food distribution system, the schools, ports, etc., would cripple them by setting in motion attempts to make them secure. Indeed, manipulating the security system in order to cause disruption must rank high on the agenda of any competent terrorist. What's more, any successful attack through, or around, the security systems (remember, such attacks are very likely to succeed) proves that the government cannot protect us.

On top of this, most security measures are ridiculous on their face. Airport security is prototypical. Everyone who flies

knows that September 11 ended forever the era of hijacking, and not because of the ensuing security. In fact, hijacking had become possible only because of U.S. policy. Bowing to pressure from the Left in the 1960s, the U.S. government failed to exercise its right to force Castro's Cuba to return hijackers, and instead defined security as disarming passengers. This succeeded in disarming everyone but hijackers. By 1969, Cuba's immunity had encouraged Arab governments to get into the hijacking business. The U.S. government's response to failed policy, however, was not to reverse it, i.e., to attack foreign governments involved with hijacking and to empower passengers to defend themselves. Rather, the government reemphasized its approach. The official instructions to passengers (in force on September 11) read like an invitation to hijackers: "Comply

with your captors' directions"; "Relax, breathe deeply"; "If told to maintain a particular body position, talk yourself into relaxing into that position, you may have to stay that way for a long time." Indeed, U.S. security policy *guaranteed* the success of the September 11 hijackings.

But the first plane that hit the World Trade Center forever ended the free ride for hijackers by showing that the federal regulations exposed passengers to death. The passengers on United Airlines flight 93 violated the regulations (for which they technically could have been prosecuted — Remember: "you must comply with all federal regulations, posted signs and placards, and crew member instructions") and attacked the hijackers, who unfortunately were already at the controls of the plane. Had they disobeyed minutes before, they would have saved themselves. Since then, a few incidents aboard aircraft have shown that the only function that henceforth a sky marshal might be able to perform would be to save a would-be hijacker from being torn apart by the passengers.

Despite the fact that anti-hijacking measures are now superfluous, the U.S. government now requires three checks of the same identity documents before boarding an airplane, and has banned more items that might be used as weapons. These now superfluous measures would have been futile on September 11. The hijackers would have satisfied any number of document checks, and could have carried out their operation using as weapons things that cannot be excluded from aircraft, such as nylon stockings; or even barehanded, using martial arts. Nor could the gun-toting, camouflage-clad soldiers who nowadays stand out like sore thumbs in America's airports have done anything to prevent September 11.

For passive security to offer any protection against enemies while reducing aggravation of innocents, it must focus very tightly on the smallest possible groups who fit terrorist profiles. In America's current war, terrorists are overwhelmingly likely to be a tiny, mostly visible minority — Arabs. But note that even Israeli security, which carries this sort of profiling to the point of outright racial discrimination, reduces the success of terrorist attempts only marginally.

Intelligence Is Impossible

ARE AMERICA'S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES culpable for failing to stop September 11? No. But for the same reasons that they could not have prevented that atrocity, it is futile to suggest that they might help punish those responsible for it and be able to prevent future terrorism. It is impossible to imagine an intelligence system that would deal successfully with any of the three problems of passive anti-terrorism: security clearances for most of the population; the multiplicity of targets that must be defended as well as the multiple ways in which they can be attacked;

and an unlimited stream of possible attackers.

Imagine a security investigation in which neither the investigators nor the evaluators can ask or even listen to anything about the subject's ethnic identity or political or philosophical beliefs, never mind sexual proclivities. This is the system in force today for clearing a few people for "Top Secret — Codeword" information, which concerns nuclear weapons, among other things. How could the U.S. government deny access to a job in Homeland Security, or as an airline pilot, to an Arab Muslim opposed to U.S. policy in the Middle East, for example? Consequently, although The Card (the American equivalent of the Soviet Internal Passport) would contain all sorts of data on your personal life, it would do nothing to impede terrorism. The first act of terrorism committed by a properly credentialed person would dispel any illusion. Alas, the routine occurrence of such events in Israel has not shaken official faith in documentation.

To protect against future terror, U.S. intelligence would have to gain foreknowledge of who, precisely, intended to do what, where, when, and how. It cannot do this both because of fundamental shortcomings and because the task is beyond even the best imaginable system.

Roughly, U.S. intelligence brings to bear against terrorism its network of communications intelligence (COMINT) and its network of human collectors. The value of COMINT with regard to terrorism has never been high and has been diminished by the technical trends of recent decades. The exponential growth in the *number of sources* of electronic communication — cell phones, computers, etc. — as well as of the *volume* of such communications has made nonsense of the standard U.S. practice of electronic sorting of grains of wheat in mountains of chaff. Moreover, the advent of near-perfect, cheap encryption has ensured that when the nuggets are found, they will be unreadable. It would have been a fluke had U.S. intelligence had any COMINT data on September 11 prior to the event. It has had none since. If any of the thousands of CIA human intelligence collectors had acquired prior knowledge, the surprise would have been even greater. These collectors simply are not in contact with any of the people who are involved with such things. CIA people work in embassies, pretend to be diplomats, and have contact only with people who normally see diplomats. Human intelligence means human contact. To make contact with terrorists, the CIA would have to operate the way the Drug Enforcement Agency does — becoming part of the drug business. But nobody at CIA knows how to do that, is capable of doing that, or wants to learn. As for the FBI, alas, they are cops who get pay raises not so much for accurate intelligence as for the number of people they put behind bars.

Imagine, however, that U.S. intelligence

were excellent in every respect. What could it contribute to passive anti-terrorism? The (new, much improved) official doctrine of the new CIA-FBI Joint Counterintelligence Office states that the intellectual point of departure for counterintelligence and counterterrorism must be identification of the U.S. assets and secrets that enemies are most likely to attack. Then analysts should identify the ways in which enemies might best wage the attacks. Once this is done, they can investigate whether in fact these attacks are being planned, how, and by whom. When analysis of "what" leads to knowledge of "who," the attacks can be frustrated. This approach makes sense as regards counterintelligence, because the targets of the attacks are few and the attacks themselves have to be in the form of slow-developing human contacts or technical deceptions. But it makes no sense with regard to terrorism because the assets that are vulnerable to attack are practically infinite in number and variety, and the modes in which they are liable to be attacked are legion. There cannot be nearly enough investigative resources to explore every possibility.

Hence counterterrorist intelligence has no choice but to begin with the question "who?" Answering this question as regards those who are preparing attacks is difficult in the retail sense, and irrelevant on the wholesale level. Both the difficulty and the irrelevance stem from the fact that those who perpetrate terrorist acts are the equivalent of soldiers in war — there are lots of them, none is remarkable before he shoots, and there are lots where they came from. How would the Drug Enforcement Agency's intelligence operate if it tried to target mere drug couriers or petty salesmen? Its agents would haunt the drug dens, cultivating petty contacts a few of which might be recruited into trafficking. By the same token, today's CIA and FBI (in the unlikely event they could manage the cover) would haunt mosques, Islamic schools, and so forth, in the hope that some of their contacts might be among those recruited for terrorism. Very occasionally all this hard work would be rewarded by a success. But all this would amount to picking off a few drops from a fire hose.

That is why intelligence is useful only in the service of intelligent policy, that is, policy that aims at eliminating the people whose elimination would turn off the hose. But as we shall see, the identity of such people is discoverable not by espionage but by intelligence in the ordinary meaning of the word. It is in this regard that U.S. intelligence is most defective. For example, since September 11, for want of sources of its own, the CIA has been accepting information on terrorism from the intelligence services of Syria and of Yasser Arafat's PLO — outfits whose agendas could not be more opposed to America's.

The gullibility of U.S. intelligence is not merely an intellectual fault. The CIA's judgment is corrupted by its longstanding commitment to certain policies. It is only a small exaggeration to say that radical Arab nationalism was invented at the CIA. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, when speaking to his brother, CIA director Allen Dulles, about the granddaddy of Arab radicalism Gamal

Abdul Nasser, used to call him "your colonel" because his takeover of Egypt had been financed by the CIA. Franz Fanon, the father of the anti-American Left in the Third World, was so close to the CIA that he chose to die under the Agency's medical care. Within the government, the CIA long has championed Arafat's PLO, even as the PLO was killing U.S. ambassadors. Under the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, CIA director George Tenet has openly supported the fiction that Arafat's "Security Forces" are something other than an army for the destruction of Israel. Before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the CIA's National Intelligence Estimate described Saddam Hussein as no threat to the region and as ready to cooperate with the United States. These are not mere errors.

Intelligence officers are most corrupted by the temptation to tell their superiors what they want to hear. Thus in September, CIA prevailed upon the intelligence service of the Czech Republic to cast doubts on reports that Mohammed Atta, the leader of the September 11 attacks, had twice met in Prague with Iraqi intelligence as he was preparing for the attacks. The Czech government later formally disavowed its service's denial and affirmed the contacts between Atta and Iraq. But the CIA insists that there is no evidence that these two professional terrorists met to discuss terrorism. Gardening, perhaps?

When weapons-grade anthrax began to appear on Capitol Hill and in U.S. post offices in October, attention naturally turned to Iraq, whose regime had run the world's largest or second-largest program for producing it. But the FBI in November, after failing to discover anything whatever concerning the provenance of the anthrax, officially gave the press a gratuitous profile of the mailer as a domestic lunatic. The domestic focus of the investigation was doubly foolish. Even if Saddam Hussein had not thought of anthrax attacks on America before October 2001, the success of the attacks that did occur, as well as the U.S. government's exoneration of foreigners, well-nigh ensured that Saddam would quickly get into the business of spreading the disease among us. Why shouldn't he? Moreover, the further "identification" of the source of the anthrax by an unidentified "intelligence source" as "some right-wing fanatic" aggravated the naturally worst effect of foreign wars: to compound domestic rivalries.

The use of intelligence not to fight the enemy but to erect a bodyguard of misimpressions around incompetent policy is not a sign of brilliance.



The third pillar of the Bush strategy, the hunt for Osama bin Laden and military action first and foremost against the Taliban, is equally problematic.

Al Qaeda Is Not The Problem

In life as in math, we judge the importance of any part of any problem or structure by factoring it out. Does the equation still work? Does the building or the argument still stand? Imagine if a magic wand were to eliminate from the earth Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and Afghanistan's Taliban regime. With them gone, would Americans be safe from Arab terrorists? No way. Then what good does it do for the U.S. government to make war on them and no one else? Why not make war on those whose elimination would eliminate terrorism?

Talk of bringing bin Laden "to justice" would sound less confident were ordinary rules of evidence to apply. The trial of bin Laden would be a nightmare of embarrassment for U.S. intelligence. Any number of uncorroborated reports from sources both unreliable and with an interest in deflecting U.S. anger away from Arab governments have painted bin Laden and his friends as devils responsible for all evils. This picture is attractive because it tends to validate decades of judgments by U.S. policy makers. The only independent test of these reports' validity came in 1998, when President Clinton launched a cruise missile strike against what "sources" had reported to be Al Qaeda's germ warfare plant in Khartoum. It turned out to be an innocent medicine factory. None of this is to deny that bin Laden and his friends are America's enemies and that their deaths would be good for us. But people like bin Laden are far from the sole practitioners

of violence against Americans and the people and conditions that brought forth all these violent anti-Americans would soon spawn others like them.

Moreover, even if bin Laden had ordered September 11, as he boasts in a recruitment video, the fire that it started in America's house has been so attractive to potential arsonists that America will not be able to rest until they are discouraged. Getting bin Laden won't help much.

The Taliban are mostly irrelevant to America. Typically Afghan and unlike the regimes of Syria, Iraq, and the PLO, the Taliban have little role in or concern with affairs beyond their land. They provide shelter to various Arabs who have brought them money and armed help against their internal rivals. But Afghans have not bloodied the world. Arabs have.

The loyalty of the Taliban to their Arab guests is of the tribal kind. The moment that the Taliban are under serious threat, they probably will give

the foreigners up. But absent the complicity of someone who knows where bin Laden is hiding, it is inconceivable that U.S. intelligence would find bin Laden's location and dispatch Special Forces that could swoop in, defeat his entourage, and take him out. It is surprising that no one has yet lured the U.S. into such an operation — and into an ambush. Destroying the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was always the only way of getting bin Laden, for what little that is worth.

From the beginning of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan on October 7, the lack of strategy for ousting the Taliban was evidence of incompetence. Since then, obvious changes in the character of operations belied U.S. spokesmen's claims that the war is "on schedule," and confirmed that those who planned the operation made no intellectual connection between the military moves they were making and the political results they expected. During the first weeks, U.S. actions were limited to bombing "fixed targets," mostly primitive air defenses and mud huts, unrelated to the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan. Only after it became undeniable that the only force that could make a dent in the regime was the Northern Alliance did U.S. bombers begin to support the Alliance's troops — but tentatively and incompetently. All war colleges teach that bombs from aircraft or artillery are useful in ground combat only insofar as they fall on enemy troops so close in time to the arrival of one's own infantry and armor that they render the enemy physically unable to resist. Whether in the two World Wars, in Vietnam, or in Kosovo, whenever significant amounts of time have passed between bombs falling on defenders and the arrival of attackers, the defenders have held. The Afghan civil war is

very much a conventional war. Nevertheless, U.S. officials began to take seriously the task of coordinating bombing and preparing the Northern Alliance for serious military operations only after more than a month of embarrassment. In the initial days and weeks, the operation was a show of weakness, not strength.

The U.S. government's misuse of force was due to its desire to see the Taliban regime lose and the Northern Alliance not win — impossible. When the Alliance did win, the tribal nature of Afghanistan guaranteed that the tribes that stood with the losers would switch sides, and that they would sell to the winners whatever strangers were in their midst. This, however, underlined the operation's fundamental flaw: just as in the Persian Gulf War, the objective was so ill-chosen that it could be attained without fixing the problem for which we had gone to war. We could win the battle and lose the war.

Hence the worst thing about the campaign against Afghanistan was its opportunity cost. Paraphrasing Livy, Machiavelli tells us "the Romans made their wars short and big." This is the wisdom of the ages: where war is concerned, the shorter and more decisive, the better, provided of course that the military objective chosen is such that its accomplishment will fix the problem. By contrast, the central message of the Bush Administration concerning the "War on Terrorism" is hardly distinguishable from that of the Johnson Administration during the Vietnam War: This war will last indefinitely, and the public must not expect decisive actions. In sum, the Bush Administration concedes that the objectives of its military operations will not solve the problem, will not bring victory. Whatever its incidental benefits, the operation is diverting U.S. efforts from inconveniencing any of America's major enemies, and it is wasting the American people's anger and commitment.

You Can't "Spin" Defeat

Sensing mounting criticism at home and abroad for ineffectiveness, President Bush addressed the world and the nation on November 8. But he did not address the question that troubled his audiences: Do you have a reasonable plan for victory, for returning the country to the tranquility of September 10? Conscious that economic activity and confidence in America were sinking, he tried to rally the public by invoking the battle cry of Todd Beamer, the passenger on Flight 93 who attacked the hijackers: "Let's roll!" But the substance of what he said undercut the spirit. Rather than asking Americans to take security into their own hands, he asked Americans for indefinite tolerance of restrictions on their freedom. Typical of the result was a *New York Times* interview with a young laid-off professional. When he watches the news, he said, "it feels like the world is going to hell, like nothing is going to get better." That is defeat.

What would victory look like?

PART II: VICTORY

For Americans, victory would mean living a quiet and peaceable life, if possible even


less troubled by the troubles of other parts of the world, even freer from searches and sirens and friction and fear, than on September 10. Hence all of the U.S. government's actions subsequent to September 11 must be judged by how they relate to that end. So what should be the U.S. government's practical objectives? Who is the enemy that stands in the way? How is this obstacle to be removed? In sum, as Thucydides' Archidamus asked the Spartans, "What is to be our war?"

The Tranquility of Order

OUR PEACE, OUR VICTORY, requires bloody vengeance for the murder of some 5,000 innocent family members and friends — we seek at least as many deaths, at least as gory, not to appease our Furies, nor even because justice requires it. Vengeance is necessary to eliminate actual enemies, and to leave no hope for any person or cause inimical to America. Killing those people, those hopes, and those causes is the *sine qua non* of our peace — and very much within our power.

Fortunately, our peace, our victory, does not require that the peoples of Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, Palestine, or indeed any other part of the world become democratic, free, or decent. They do not require any change in anybody's religion. We have neither the power nor the right to make such changes. Nor, fortunately, does our peace depend on making sure that others will like us. We have no power to make that happen. Neither our nor anyone else's peace has ever depended on creating "New World Orders," "collective security," or "communities of power." International relations are not magic. Our own peace does not depend on any two foreign governments being at peace with each other. It is not in our power or in the power of any third party to force such a peace except by making war on both governments. Much less does our peace depend on a "comprehensive peace" in the Middle East or anywhere else. It is not in our power to make such a peace except by conquering whole regions of the world. Our peace and prosperity do not depend on the existence of friendly regimes in any country whatever, including Saudi Arabia. That is fortunate, because we have no power to determine "who rules" in any other country.

Virtually all America's statesmen until Woodrow Wilson warned that the rest of mankind would not develop ideas and habits like ours or live by our standards. Hence we should not expect any relief from the permanent burdens of international affairs, and of war. Indeed, statesmen from Washington to



sands does not interfere with the production of the oil that lies beneath them. That we can do, if we will.

In sum, ending the war that broke out on September 11 with our peace will require a lot of killing — to eliminate those in any way responsible for attacking us, and those who might cause further violence to us or choke the world's economy by troubling the supply of oil. It turns out that these mostly are the same persons. Who then are the enemies whose deaths will bring us peace?

It's The Regime, Stupid

When the suicide pilots of September 11 died, they made nonsense of the notion that terrorism was perpetrated by and on behalf of "senseless" individuals, and that the solution to terrorism lay in "bringing to justice" the bombers and trigger pullers. If this notion were adhered to, the fact that the terrorists had already gone to justice should have ended the matter, except for some ritual exhortation to states to be a bit more

careful about madmen in their populations.

But these terrorists were neither madmen nor on the edges of society. They came from well-established families. They had more than casual contacts with the political movements and intelligence services of their own regime and of neighboring countries. They acted on behalf of international causes that are the main sources of legitimacy for some regimes of the Middle East, and are tolerated by all. These causes include a version of Islam; a version of Arab nationalism; driving Westerners and Western influence from Islamic lands; and ridding the Arab world of more or less pro-Western regimes like that of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates. Moreover, peoples and regimes alike cheered their acts. In short, these acts were not private. Rather, they were much like the old Western practice of "privateering" (enshrined in Article I of our own Constitution, *vide* "letters of Marque and Reprisal"), in which individuals not under formal discipline of governments nevertheless were chartered by governments to make war on their behalf.

Since the terrorists of September 11 are dead and we sense that their deeds were not merely on their own behalf but rather that they acted as soldiers, the question imposes itself: Whose soldiers? Who is responsible? Whose death will bring us peace?

Islam is not responsible. It has been around longer than the United States, and coexisted with it peacefully for two hundred years. No doubt a version of Islam — Islamism — a cross between the Wahabi sect and secular anti-Westernism, is central to those who want to kill Americans. But it is neither necessary nor sufficient nor possible for Americans to enter into intra-Muslim theological debates. Besides, these debates are

Lincoln made clear that any attempt to dictate another people's regime or religion would likelier result in resentment abroad and faction at home than in any relief from foreign troubles. We can and must live permanently in a world of alien regimes and religions. The mere difference in religion or mode of government does not mean that others will trouble our peace. Whether or not any foreign rulers make or allow war on America is a matter of their choice alone. We can talk, negotiate, and exercise economic pressure on rulers who trouble our peace. But if they make war on us we have no choice but to make war on them and kill them. Though we cannot determine who will rule, we surely can determine who will neither rule nor live.

What do we want from the Middle East to secure our peace? Neither democracy nor a moderate form of Islam — only that the region's leaders neither make nor allow war on us, lest they die. We have both the right and the capacity to make sure of that. But is it not necessary for our peace that the countries of the region be ruled by regimes friendly to us? No. By all accounts, the Saudi royal family's personal friendship with Americans has not affected their aiding and abetting terror against us. It is necessary only that any rulers, whatever their inclinations might be, know that they and their entourages will be killed, surely and brutally, if any harm to Americans originates from within their borders. Respect beats friendship. Do we not have to make sure that the oil of the Middle East continues to fuel the world economy? Is this not necessary to our peace? Indeed. But this does not burden us with the impossible task of ensuring that Saudi Arabia and the Oil States are ruled by friendly regimes. We need only ensure that whoever rules those hot

not terribly relevant. The relevant fact is that the re-definition of Islam into something harmful to us is the work of certain regimes and could not survive without them.

Regimes are forms of government, systems of incentives and disincentives, of honors and taboos and habits. Each kind of regime gives prominence to some kinds of people and practices, while pushing others to the margins of society. Different regimes bring out different possibilities inherent in the same people. Thus the Japanese regime prior to World War II changed the meaning of the national religion of Shinto from quaint rituals to militant emperor-worship. Germany meant vastly different things to the German people and to the world when it was under the regime established by Konrad Adenauer, rather than the one established by Adolf Hitler. In short, regimes get to define themselves and the people who live under them.

Note that Palestine's Yasser Arafat, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, and Syria's Assad family have made themselves the icons of Islamism despite the fact that they are well known atheists who live un-Muslim lives and have persecuted unto death the Muslim movements in their countries. Nevertheless, they represent the hopes of millions for standing up to Westerners, driving Israel (hated more for its Westernness than its Jewishness) out of the Holy Land, and undoing the regimes that stand with the West. These tyrants represent those hopes because they in fact have managed to do impressive anti-Western deeds and have gotten away with it. The Middle East's memory of the Gulf War is that Saddam tried to drive a Western lackey out of Kuwait and then withstood the full might of America, later to spit in its face. The Middle East's view of Palestine is that Arafat and the Assads champion the rights of Islam against the Infidels.

Nor are the Arab peoples or Arab nationalism necessarily our enemies. America co-existed peacefully with Arabs for two centuries. Indeed, the United States is largely responsible for pushing Britain and France to abandon colonial and neo-colonial rule over Arab peoples in the 1950s. U.S. policy has been unfailingly — perhaps blindly — in favor of Arab nationalism. It is true that Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser founded Arab nationalism on an anti-American basis in the 1950s. It is true that in 1958 the Arab Socialist Party's (*Ba'ath*) coup in Iraq and Syria gave Arab nationalism a mighty push in the anti-American direction. It is true that the Soviet Union and radical Arabs created the Palestine Liberation Organization as an anti-Western movement. But it is also true that Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and, since 1973, Egypt have been just as Arab and just as nationalistic, though generally more pro-Western.

How did the PLO and the *Ba'ath* regimes of Syria and Iraq gather to themselves the



mantle of Arab nationalism? First, the Saudis and the Emirates gave them money, while Americans and Europeans gave them respect and money. Saudis, Americans and Europeans gave these things in no small part because the radical Arabs employed terrorism from the very first, and Saudi, American, and European politicians, and Israelis as well, hoped to domesticate the radicals, buy them off, or divert them to other targets — including each other. Second and above all, we have given them victories, which they have used as warrants for strengthening their hold on their peoples and for recruiting more terrorists against us.

Today, Iraq, Syria, and the PLO are the effective cause of global terrorism. More than half of the world's terrorism since 1969, and nearly all of it since the fall of the Soviet Union, has been conducted on behalf of the policies and against the enemies of those three regimes. By comparison, Libya, Iran, and Sudan have been minor players. Afghanistan is just a place on the map. Factor these three malefactors out of the world's political equation, and what reason would any Arab inclined to Islamism or radical nationalism have to believe that such causes would stand a chance of success? Which intelligence service would provide would-be terrorists with the contacts, the money, the training to enter and fight the West or Israel? For whom, in short, would they soldier?

The Iraqi, Syrian, and the PLO regimes are no more true nationalists than they are true Muslims. They are regimes of a party, in the mold of the old Soviet Union. Each is based on a narrow segment of society and rules by physically eliminating its enemies. Iraq is actually not a nation-state but an empire. The ruling *Ba'ath* party comes from

the Mesopotamian Sunni Arabs, the smallest of the empire's three ethnic groups. The ruling faction of the party, Saddam's *Tikriti*, are a tiny fraction of the ruling party. The Assad family that rules Syria is even more isolated. The faction of the local *Ba'ath* party that is their instrument of power is made up almost exclusively of Alewites, a neo-Islamic sect widely despised in the region. It must rely exclusively on corrupt, hated security forces. Yasser Arafat rules the PLO through the *Fatah* faction, which lives by a combination of buying off competitors with money acquired from the West and Israel, and killing them. Each of the regimes consists of some 2,000 people. These include officials

of the ruling party, officers in the security forces down to the level of colonel, plus all the general officers of the armed forces. These also include top government officials, officials of the major economic units, the media, and of course the leaders of the party's "social organizations" (labor, youth, women's professional, etc.).

All these regimes are weak. They have radically impoverished and brutalized their peoples. A few members of the ruling party may be prepared to give their lives for the anti-Western causes they represent, but many serve out of fear or greed. The Gulf War and the Arab-Israeli wars proved that their armies and security forces are brittle: tough so long as the inner apparatus of coercion is unchallenged, likely to disintegrate once it is challenged.

Killing these regimes would be relatively easy, would be a favor to the peoples living under them, and is the only way to stop terrorism among us.

On Killing Regimes

IT FOLLOWS THAT KILLING REGIMES MEANS killing their members in ways that discredit the kinds of persons they were, the ways they lived, the things and ideas to which they gave prominence, the causes they espoused, and the results of their rule. Thus the Western Allies de-Nazified Germany not by carpet-bombing German cities, which in fact was the only thing that persuaded ordinary Germans that they and the Nazis were in the same boat. The Allies killed the Nazi regime by killing countless Nazis in battle, hanging dozens of survivors, imprisoning hundreds, and disqualifying thousands from social and economic prominence. The Allies promised to do worse to anyone who tried Nazism again, left no doubt in the minds of

Germans that their many sorrows had been visited on them by the Nazis, and made Nazism into a dirty word.

Clearly, it is impossible to kill any regime by killing its people indiscriminately. In the Gulf War, U.S. forces killed uncounted tens of thousands of Iraqis whose deaths made no difference to the outcome of the war and the future of the region, while consciously sparing the much smaller number who made up the regime. Hence those who want to "bomb the hell out of the Arabs" or "nuke Baghdad" in response to September 11 are making the same mistake. Killing must be tailored to political effect. This certainly means invading Iraq, and perhaps Syria, with ground troops. It means openly sponsoring Israel's invasion of the PLO territories. But it does not mean close supervision or the kind of political reconstruction we performed in Germany and Japan after World War II.

It is important that U.S. forces invade Iraq with the stated objective of hanging Saddam and whoever we judge to have been too close to him. Once those close to him realize that this is going to happen and cannot be stopped, they will kill one another, each trying to demonstrate that he was farther from the tyrant than anyone else. But America's reputation for bluff and for half measures is so entrenched that the invasion will have to make progress greater than in the Gulf War in order for this to happen. At this point, whether or not Saddam himself falls into U.S. hands alive along with his subordinates, it is essential that all be denounced, tried, and hanged on one charge only: having made war on America, on their own people, and on their neighbors. The list of people executed should follow the party-government's organization chart as clearly as possible. It is equally essential that everyone who hears of the event be certain that something even more drastic would follow the recrudescence of such a regime. All this should happen as quickly as possible.

After settling America's quarrel, America should leave Iraq to the peoples who live there. These would certainly break the empire into its three ethnic constituents: Kurds in the North, Mesopotamian Sunnis in the center, and Marsh Shiites in the South. How they may govern themselves, deal with one another and with their neighbors, is no business of ours. What happens in Iraq is simply not as important to us as the internal developments of Germany and Japan were. It is enough that the Iraqis know that we would be ready to defend whatever interest of ours they might threaten. Prestige is a reputation for effective action in one's own interest. We would have re-earned our prestige, and hence our right to our peace.

In the meantime, we should apologize to Israel for having pressured her to continue absorbing terrorist attacks. We should urge Israel to act decisively to earn her own peace, which would involve destroying the regime of the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel could do this more easily than we could destroy Saddam's regime in Iraq. The reason is that the regime of the PLO, the so-called Palestine Liberation Authority, is wholly

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72 Black-Eyed Virgins?

BY YOTAM FELDNER

APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO the attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., CBS's *60 Minutes* aired a report on the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas. Reporter Bob Simon interviewed Hamas operative Muhammad Abu Wardeh, who recruited terrorists for suicide bombings in Israel. Abu Wardeh's words were translated into English by CBS as follows: "I described to him how God would compensate the martyr for sacrificing his life for his land. If you become a martyr, God will give you 70 virgins, 70 wives and everlasting happiness."

Some Muslim leaders contended that the English translation did not match the Arabic and accused CBS of fabricating the quote. Leaders of the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), a U.S. organization, wrote to *60 Minutes* and demanded a retraction, an apology, and time on the show for Islamic scholars to explain the religion's true teachings regarding violence and martyrdom.

CBS translated the Arabic term *hur 'ayn* as "virgins." According to two native Arabic speakers, Hafez Al-Mirazi Osman, Washington bureau chief of the Al-Jazeera television network, and Dr. Maher Hathout, a scholar at the Islamic Center of Southern California, the Arabic word has no sexual connotation or gender. Hathout said that a more appropriate translation would be "angel" or "heavenly being."

MPAC's Executive Director in Los Angeles, Salaam Al-Maryati, said that the issue is important to the estimated 7 to 10 million Muslims who he claims live in the U.S., because it confirms their fears that media organizations are intent on defaming their faith. In a published report, Hathout added, "There is nothing in the Koran or in Islamic teachings about 70 virgins or sex in Paradise. This is ridiculous, and every true Muslim knows that."

Maryati's and Hathout's claims aroused the ire of Sheikh Abd Al-Hadi Palazzi, head of the Cultural Institute of the Italian Islamic Community. Sheikh Palazzi wrote: "The only ridiculous thing is that someone who claims to be an 'Islamic scholar' makes public statements which prove beyond any possible doubt that he has never read the Tafsir [Koranic commentary] of Ibn Kathir and the Sunan [religious rulings based on the customs of the Prophet] of Imam Al-Tirmidhi, which are basic books for the knowledge of Islam. Unfortunately, this seems to be the rule in American Islamic Centers controlled by the fundamentalist network of the Muslim Brotherhood."

Sheikh Palazzi states there are 72 wives for every believer who is admitted to Paradise, not only for a martyr. Ibn Kathir in his Tafsir of

Surah Al-Rahman (55), verse 72, quotes "the Prophet Muhammad saying: 'The smallest reward for the people of Paradise is an abode where there are 80,000 servants and 72 wives, over which stands a dome decorated with pearls, aquamarine, and ruby.'"

The "black-eyed" are mentioned in verse 74 of the same Surah, as well as three other Surahs in the Koran: Al-Dukhan 54, Al-Tur 20, and Al-Waqi'a 20. Women with "downcast eyes," that is, chaste women, are mentioned in three Surahs: Al-Rahman 56-8, Al-Safat 48, and S, 52.

Al-Azhar University in Egypt, the main authority for Sunni Islamic rulings, also takes "the black-eyed" seriously. Sheikh Abd Al-Fattah Gam'an, deputy director of Al-Azhar's Center for Islamic Studies, has written:

The Koran tells us that in Paradise believers get 'the black-eyed,' as Allah has said. 'The black-eyed' are white and delicate, and the black of their eyes is blacker than black and the white [of their eyes] is whiter than white. To describe their beauty and their great number, the Koran says that they are 'like sapphire and pearls' (Al-Rahman 58) in their value, in their color, and in their purity.

Most of 'the black-eyed' were first created in Paradise, but some of them are women [who came to Paradise] from this world, and are obedient Muslims. When the women of this world are old and worn out, Allah creates them [anew] after their old age into virgins who are amiable to their husbands. At the side of the Muslim in Paradise are his wives from this world, if they are among the dwellers in Paradise, along with 'the black-eyed' of Paradise.

Dr. Hathout described the Koran passages as nothing more than folklore, saying that such descriptions of Paradise aren't meant to be taken literally, just as many Christians do not really believe Heaven has "streets paved with gold."

But do Muslims living in areas where Jihad has been declared — for example, the West Bank and Gaza Strip — also maintain "such descriptions of Paradise aren't meant to be taken literally?"

The death announcements of martyrs in the Palestinian press often take the form of wedding, not funeral, announcements. "With great pride, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad marries the member of its military wing ... the martyr and hero Yasser Al-Adhami, to 'the black-eyed,'" read one suicide bomber's death notice.

The same view is also evident in news reports in the Palestinian press. Thus, for example: "The mother of Wail 'Awad, from Deir El-Balah, did not plan on holding a second wedding for her eldest son, after his marriage on August 10, 2001 to his fiancée in a simple ceremony attended only by the family. But yesterday was Wail's real wedding day, and the angels of the Merciful married him,

together with the [other] martyrs, to 'the black-eyed,' as all around [them] rose the cries of joy that his mother dreamed of on the day of his wedding [to his fiancée]."

Hamas official Ashraf Sawafah told of a ceremony honoring Izz Al-Din Al-Masri, who carried out the suicide bombing of the Sbarro pizzeria in central Jerusalem on August 9, 2001: "His relatives distributed sweets and accepted their son as a bridegroom married to 'the black-eyed,' not as someone who had been killed and was being laid in the ground."

The Hamas movement educates the children in its schools, beginning in kindergarten, to believe that a martyr is given virgins in Paradise. Jack Kelley of *USA Today* visited Hamas schools in Gaza City, where he saw an 11-year-old boy speak to his class: "I will make my body a bomb that will blast the flesh of Zionists, the sons of pigs and monkeys ... I will tear their bodies into little pieces and will cause them more pain than they will ever know." His classmates shouted in response, "Allah Akhbar," and his teacher shouted, "May the virgins give you pleasure." A 16-year-old Hamas youth leader in a Gaza refugee camp told Kelley, "Most boys can't stop thinking about the virgins."

Palestinian Muslim clerics also help instill this belief. In an interview with the Egyptian daily *Al-Ahram Al-Arabi*, Palestinian Authority Mufti Sheikh 'Ikrima Sabri was asked what he felt when he prayed for the soul of a martyr. He answered: "I feel that the martyr is lucky, because angels bring him to his wedding in Paradise."

Sheikh Abd Al-Salam Abu Shukheydem, Chief Mufti (a professional jurist who interprets Muslim law) of the Palestinian Authority police force, has described the rewards of martyrs: "From the moment the first drop of his blood is spilled, he does not feel the pain of his wounds and he is forgiven for all his sins; he sees his seat in Paradise; he is saved from the torment of the grave; he is saved from the great horror of Judgment Day; he marries 'the black-eyed'; he vouches for 70 of his family members; he gains the crown of honor, the precious stone of which is better than this entire world and everything in it."

"The Americans and the eunuchs at their sides [i.e. the rulers of Arab and Islamic countries]... think that if they kill us, they will win," wrote Dr. Yunis Al-Astal, a lecturer in the Islamic Law Department at Gaza Islamic University, "They do not know that with their weapons they only expedite our arrival in Paradise. We yearn to reach Paradise; it is our abode, and in it are 'the black-eyed,' confined to pavilions, and also there are [women] with downcast eyes whose chastity has not been violated before us.... In contrast, the value of this world in which we live... is in our eyes not worth the wing of a mosquito."

In an interview with the Israeli daily *Ha'aretz*, Sheikh Raid Salah, the leader of the Islamic Movement in Israel, and the most important political and religious leader of Israel's Arab population was asked "Do 70 vir-

gins await a *shahid* (a martyr) in Paradise?" Sheikh Salah replied: "On this matter, we have proof. It is written in the Koran and in the Sunna [the traditions about the life of Mohammed]. This matter is clear."

The suicide attackers who carried out the September 11 attacks also believed that "the black-eyed" were one of the rewards awaiting them in Paradise. The letter of instructions found in Nawwaf Al-Hamzi's car said: "...be confident and rest assured that you are carrying out an action that Allah likes and that pleases Him. Therefore, a day will come, Allah willing, that you will spend with 'the black-eyed' in Paradise.... Know that the gardens [i.e. Paradise] have been decorated for you with the most beautiful ornaments and that 'the black-eyed' will call to you: 'Come, faithful of Allah,' after having donned their finest garments."

Are "the black-eyed" available for sex? Some evidently think they are. The Israeli media reported on a suicide bomber caught before he managed to carry out his mission; he was wearing a towel as a loincloth to protect his genitals for use in Paradise.

The question of sexual relations was also brought up in an interview that Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi gave to the Egyptian weekly *Aakher Sa'a*. "It is enough that we know that Paradise offers [everything] to satisfy the soul and gladden the eye," said Tantawi. "Regarding other, private matters, only Allah knows."

In a review of the Egyptian press in the London daily *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, the veteran Egyptian journalist Hasanain Kurum explained that Sheikh Tantawi knowingly gave a vague answer to the question, so as to avoid a scandal like the one created a few years previously by the late author and journalist Muhammad Galal Al-Kushk. Al-Kushk wrote, "The men in Paradise have sexual relations not only with the women [who come from this world] and with 'the black-eyed,' but also with the serving boys." According to Kurum, Al-Kushk also stated, "In Paradise, a believer's penis is eternally erect."

Yotam Feldner is director of Media Analysis for the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), an independent, non-profit organization that translates and analyzes the media of the Middle East. This is excerpted from a much longer article. To read the unabridged version, complete with source citations, visit www.memri.org.

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Between Heaven and Hell

BY PAUL A. CANTOR

Hamlet in Purgatory, by Stephen Greenblatt. Princeton University Press, 322 pages, \$29.95

IN AN ESSAY IN THE FALL 1993 ISSUE OF *Academic Questions*, I called Stephen Greenblatt "the most influential literary critic of this generation." I stick by that judgment today. As the principal founder of the movement known as the New Historicism, he has, for good or ill, done more than anyone else to shape the way literary criticism is currently practiced. He directed critics away from studying works of literature as free-standing artistic masterpieces and toward integrating them into broader cultural contexts. And, unlike many of his followers, Greenblatt is himself a literary craftsman, who writes a clear and elegant prose. Thus his books are always worth reading — not just by specialists in the field but also by anyone interested in learning what is happening in literary studies at the moment.

Thus when word got around that Greenblatt was writing a book-length study of *Hamlet*, his many admirers and even his detractors looked forward to seeing the results. *Hamlet in Purgatory* will not disappoint those who have been eagerly awaiting its publication, but it does not quite live up to what Hollywood would call its advance billing. It is not one of Greenblatt's stronger books, and his earlier works, such as *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* and *Shakespearean Negotiations*, would better serve readers looking for an introduction to his distinctive approach. In those books, Greenblatt was able to do in a single chapter roughly what it takes him a whole book to do in *Hamlet in Purgatory*. Shakespeare's most famous play did not unfortunately, inspire Greenblatt to his best work.

Nevertheless, *Hamlet in Purgatory* in many respects serves as the culmination of Greenblatt's long-term project as a cultural historian. Throughout his career he has been fascinated by the way modern artistic forms hollow out traditional cultural institutions and yet carry on their social function. That is the way Greenblatt conceives the relation of *Hamlet* to the Catholic doctrine of Purgatory. As Greenblatt tells the story, Shakespeare was dealing in *Hamlet* with a crisis in religious representation at the end of the 16th century in England, as the Protestant Reformation remade the way the English thought about the afterlife. Greenblatt shows at great length how Purgatory served a vital psychological function for people in the late Middle Ages, helping them to come to terms

with the loss of loved ones, especially by leading them to believe that they could do something to relieve the suffering of family and friends in the other world. That "something" usually turned out to involve donations to the Catholic Church, sometimes on a massive scale, and thus played into the hands of unscrupulous clerics, who could exploit the fears and hopes raised by the prospect of Purgatory. That, at least, was the accusation made by would-be reformers of the Catholic Church, complaints and charges that eventually led to the Protestant Reformation, which, as Greenblatt documents in detail, often focused its attack on Catholicism precisely on the issue of Purgatory. When the newly created Church of England rejected the Catholic idea of Purgatory as a poetic fiction, it eliminated a potential source of ecclesiastical abuse, but at the same time it created a vacuum in the imagination of religious believers, taking away one of their chief sources of consolation in the face of the brute fact of death.

According to Greenblatt, the Elizabethan theater moved in to fill this vacuum, with its many ghosts and other supernatural apparitions on the stage. In the make-believe world of the theater, playwrights could still conjure with purgatorial images even when they had been forbidden in the pulpit. Greenblatt cites Protestant reformers who actually refer to the migration of traditional beliefs to the stage — for example, Reginald Scot, who in his *Discoverie of Witchcraft* (1584) makes fun of people who claim to be witches: "I for my part have read a number of their conjurations, but never could see any devils of theirs, except it were in a play."

Hamlet becomes the centerpiece of Greenblatt's discussion because of the perplexing combination of Protestant and Catholic elements in the play. As Greenblatt argues, Hamlet himself seems to have a Protestant sensibility — especially in his skepticism; he was after all educated in Wittenberg, the city of Martin Luther. And yet the ghost of Hamlet's father seems Catholic in conception; he comes to his son from beyond the grave, out of a realm that seems to have all the trappings of the traditional Purgatory except the name. Like many before him, Greenblatt puzzles over the tension between the Protestant and Catholic strains in *Hamlet*, and ends up suggesting that the play mirrors the anxieties generated by England's painful transition from one form of Christianity to another. Greenblatt even raises the possibility that *Hamlet* helped Shakespeare come to terms



with the death of his own father, though here the critic displays a knowledge of the author's inner life that reduces me to abject envy: "In 1601 the Protestant playwright was haunted by the spirit of his Catholic father pleading for suffrages to relieve his soul from the pains of Purgatory."

In such a brief summary, I cannot do justice to the suggestiveness of Greenblatt's argument, which, as always in his work, makes us take a fresh look at a familiar classic. But as is also typical of Greenblatt, *Hamlet in Purgatory* tends to raise more questions than it answers. For all the accumulation of detail, there are some strange gaps in Greenblatt's picture of Purgatory. The most surprising omission is Greenblatt's failure to discuss Dante in anything other than an incidental manner. He admits that Dante gives the "highest expression" to the imaginative experience

of Purgatory, and yet says nothing substantive about the *Divine Comedy*, evidently because the *Purgatorio* does not figure explicitly in the Protestant polemics on which Greenblatt focuses. But this fact is in itself worthy of more scrutiny than Greenblatt gives it, and discussing the *Purgatorio* — which is after all the most famous representation of Purgatory in literature — would seem essential to Greenblatt's project.

Dante manages to combine a richly detailed evocation of Purgatory with attacks on precisely the ecclesiastical abuses that angered later Protestant reformers. His criticism of the Papacy and specific Popes was so stinging that it almost landed the *Divine Comedy* on the Catholic Church's *Index of Forbidden Books* in later years. Greenblatt's omitting Dante from his picture of Purgatory no doubt simplified his task, but one must

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wonder whether it resulted in an oversimplification of the doctrinal history he outlines.

I do not, however, wish to leave the impression that Greenblatt ends up drawing simplistic conclusions about Hamlet. If anything, the problem with this book is Greenblatt's tendency to overcomplicate and overqualify his claims. In what I like to refer to as the Greenblatt Shuffle, he typically makes a claim with one breath, and then takes it back with another. Consider this characteristic passage:

Does this mean that Shakespeare was participating in a secularization process, one in which the theater offers a disenchanted version of what the cult of Purgatory once offered? Perhaps. But the palpable effect is something like the reverse: Hamlet immeasurably intensifies a sense of the weirdness of the theater, its proximity to certain experiences that had been organized and exploited by religious institutions and rituals.

This passage actually exemplifies what is most attractive in Greenblatt's prose. He eloquently testifies to the genuine complexity of his subject matter, and surely in the case of *Hamlet* any critic is entitled to hesitate to give definitive answers and to offer alternate readings of a play that has puzzled critics for centuries. But to anyone who might want to criticize Greenblatt's claim that *Hamlet*

marks a secularization of Christian beliefs, it is frustrating to find that when he finally offers that thesis at the end of his book, he states it in the form of a question, adds a qualifying "perhaps" with a whole sentence all to itself, and immediately suggests that the opposite may be true — thereby disarming all criticism of what at first appeared to be his central argument.

More generally, much of the intellectual excitement of *Hamlet in Purgatory* is generated by the fact that Greenblatt revives the old argument that Shakespeare may have been a closet Catholic, or what was known as a "recusant" in Elizabethan days (someone who refused to participate in the new Anglican Church). Greenblatt toys with this notion, but when he comes around to stating it, he does so with his usual caginess: "It is conceivable that Shakespeare, with his recusant family background, his education in Stratford by teachers linked to Campion and the Jesuits, his own possible links to Lancashire recusants, felt a covert loyalty to those structures [Catholic institutions] and a dismay that they were being gutted."

Of course almost anything is conceivable in the absence of real evidence; it is equally conceivable that Shakespeare was a militant Protestant or a freethinker. With his usual rhetorical skill, Greenblatt manages to frame

his sentence so that what appears to be conjectural in it is only the matter of whether Shakespeare was dismayed by what happened to Catholicism in 16th-century England. But actually all of the apparent "facts" laid out in this sentence are deeply disputed by Shakespeare scholars. For example, Greenblatt's claim that Shakespeare's father was a Catholic recusant largely rests on an extremely questionable document (not discovered until 1757 and mysteriously and conveniently lost soon thereafter before it could be definitively authenticated). Greenblatt is aware of how dubious this document is; if one follows up his citations, one sees how skeptical one of his chief sources, Samuel Schoenbaum, is about this supposed discovery (he points out that the scholar who originally authenticated the document later repudiated it). But in the body of Greenblatt's text as opposed to the notes, he manages to convey the impression that this document offers more solid evidence than it really does.

Just as one might be gearing up to challenge Greenblatt's claims about Shakespeare's Catholicism, one finds him beginning the very next paragraph: "We do not, however, need to believe that Shakespeare was himself a secret Catholic sympathizer; we need only to recognize how alert he was to the materials that were being

made available to him." There is a kind of admirable intellectual honesty in Greenblatt's willingness to reverse himself this way, but it also seems to reflect his desire as a critic to have his cake and eat it too. He impresses his readers by seeming to make the strong claim that Shakespeare was a secret Catholic, but to anyone who challenges the evidence for that claim, he can always reply: "I am not claiming that Shakespeare was a Catholic; only that he was aware of the problems Catholics were facing in sixteenth-century England." That is a much weaker claim and frankly less exciting, though of course more easily defended.

I must confess my own frustration at not knowing how seriously to take what appear to be some of Greenblatt's fundamental claims and thus not really knowing which claims to criticize. Granted, he has illuminated *Hamlet* from a fresh perspective and anyone studying the play will want to come to terms with what Greenblatt has to say about it. Still, Greenblatt seems content to leave his readers not in Purgatory but in limbo.

Paul A. Cantor is professor of English at the University of Virginia and author most recently of *Gilligan Unbound: Pop Culture in the Age of Globalization* (Rowman & Littlefield).

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The Bacterium That Changed History

BY MICHAEL FUMENTO

In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World it Made, by Norman F. Cantor. Free Press, 230 pages, \$25

TO A NATION THAT WRITHES IN MASS Hysteria over the premeditated deaths of a handful of people from anthrax, of what avail to attempt to describe an epidemic that appeared from nowhere and within just two years (1348-49) wiped out about a third of Britons, and within four years killed a third of all Europeans? Consider this: 650 years after that tidal wave of mortality that became known in English-speaking countries as "the Black Death," the word "plague" remains one of the most powerful in our language. Though rarely used in its original sense, the term has carved for itself a special place in the deepest, darkest chasm of humanity's collective memory.

But aside from our lexicon, can something plow through Europe's population not just once but repeatedly in lesser epidemics without leaving a lasting impression? Assuredly not, which is where medieval historian Norman Cantor's *In the Wake of the Plague* enters.

We begin with young Princess Joan of England, daughter of Edward III and sister of Edward the Black Prince, on her way to Spain to marry the heir to the Castilian throne. Had the marriage taken place, the probable outcome would have been the uniting of the kingdoms of England, Wales, most of Spain, and much of France under the Plantagenet banner.

Alas, poor Joan had the misfortune to stop at the royal château in Bordeaux in 1548, a shipping dock crawling with weak and dying rats. As their fleas forsook the dead for the succor of the living, the 15-year-old princess watched in horror as one by one her entourage sickened and died from a bacterium identified centuries later as *Yersinia pestis*. Finally, it was young Joan's turn. With the port area fired in an attempt to contain the plague, her body was never recovered. The same could be said of her father's aspirations.

Spain remained outside the Plantagenet camp, while repeated efforts to take the country by force sapped England's strength to battle the French. Moreover, the plague-caused death of Henry of Grosmont would eventually lead to the rise of the House of Lancaster and the War of the Roses. Given the pattern of interlocking royal marriages, had Princess Joan and Henry of Grosmont lived, the map of Europe (as well as that of North and South America) might well be vastly different today.



But the Great Mortality affected not just kings and kingdoms. "Slowly it was realized that institutions and the populace would be deeply affected by the great biomedical devastation and sudden severe shrinkage of the population," writes Cantor. "The pestilence deeply affected individual and family behavior and consciousness. It severely strained social, political, and economic systems. It threatened the stability and viability of civilizations... Nothing like this has happened before or since in the recorded history of mankind."

Some changes were both immediate and massive. With so many jobs left unfilled in a labor-intensive society, serfs could demand greater freedoms from their lords or become free men. Wage earners could extract more money for their skills despite widespread laws to the contrary. Capitalism was boosted by the bite of a flea.

Landholders gained from inheritances of money, land, and titles of nobility in a ghastly sort of reverse lottery.

Less lasting was the psychological impact, where there was clearly more pain than gain among survivors. This was all the more so after the plague returned in 1361, bringing with it the realization that henceforth it would be a recurring visitor. Society then became as obsessed with confronting mortality as we are now with avoiding it. We hide not only the dead but the dying from sight, change "dead end" signs to read "no exit," and try to fight wars with no fatalities on our side and no civilian deaths on the enemy's.

Post-plague society, conversely, obsessed over death in art and literature. Images of dancing skeletons and decomposing corpses became the pop art of their day.

Then there are the "What if?" aspects. Consider the case of Thomas Bradwardine, a clergyman and former Oxford University academic struck down just after his consecration by the pope (at that time in residence in Avignon) as the Archbishop of Canterbury. Bradwardine was the culmination of the great Oxford intellectual movement that had begun in the 1240s. As England's top clergyman, he would have been a rare beast with his intellectual power and apparent desire to resist Church dogma (and hence the dogma) on scientific and health questions. He had Copernican ideas of the universe 150 years before Copernicus and 250 years before Galileo. When he died of plague, along with the great English philosopher William of Occam (whence "Occam's razor"), that movement came to an end.

Thus "the Oxford approach of the early 14th century led ultimately to the modern scientific world, which after about 1940 with the development of antibiotics, could actually counter an outbreak of infectious disease," writes Cantor. "But nothing tangible came of their remarkable scientific work...."

Criticisms? If you're looking for something comprehensive, you'll have to keep looking. Barbara Tuchman's classic history of the 14th century, *A Distant Mirror*, and William H. McNeill's wonderful *Plagues*

and *Peoples* would be better places to start. And the book finishes as abruptly as Alfred Hitchcock's film "The Birds," which is inexcusable even if a sequel is planned.

It's also a waste that such a short book would devote pages to the distracting and unconvincing argument that much of what passed for plague was actually the horror *du jour*, anthrax. Although anthrax was certainly endemic at the time because of widespread animal husbandry, we are all now familiar with the symptoms of anthrax — and huge, swollen oozing black buboes (lymph nodes) are not among them. Since Cantor also falls for such urban legendry as that the "Ring Around the Rosies" circle dance comes down to us from the Black Death (it appears nowhere in literature before 1881), one wonders what else he too readily accepted.

Yet Cantor is to be congratulated for encouraging the exploration of a much-neglected area of history, the biomedical and historical implications of one of history's most cataclysmic events. Coming out as it did just before we began wrestling with our own ghosts of a biomedical (albeit primarily psychological) assault, the timing perhaps couldn't have been better.

Michael Fumento is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. where he specializes in health and science issues. His next book is *BioEvolution: How Biotechnology Is Changing our World*.

BOOKS IN BRIEF

***The Broken Hearth: Reversing the Moral Collapse of the American Family*, by William J. Bennett. Doubleday, 208 pages, \$22.95**

WILLIAM BENNETT'S LATEST BOOK PROVIDES a succinct account of the dissolution of the family and the morality that supports it. In this slender and readable volume, Bennett takes just the right tone in discussing, and defending, marriage and family — subjects that are political, with immense social repercussions, and yet involve the deepest of personal sentiments. The book is deliberative, well reasoned, and sympathetic, but nonetheless presses upon the reader the magnitude of the crisis of the American family.


The story Bennett tells is sad — indeed, heartbreaking. He shows, without a hint of shrillness or smugness, the depth of human suffering that has accompanied the destruction of the family, while also painting a vivid picture of the goodness and desirability of a healthy family. He tackles head-on the leading arguments against the nuclear family and the traditional roles of motherhood and fatherhood. And he shows that at the center of these liberal and libertarian doctrines and institutions is a rejection of objective morality that undermines not only the family but also all that Americans once considered good, decent, and sacred.

Going beyond the usual conservative argument for the social utility of the family, Bennett explains in human terms the real happiness and contentment that spring from a healthy family life. Such an effort is critically important today, when so many Americans will never themselves be part of a happy family. —Thomas Krannawitter

***A New Religious America: How a "Christian Country" Has Become the World's Most Religiously Diverse Nation*, by Diana L. Eck. Harper San Francisco, 416 pages, \$27**

SOCIOLOGIST NATHAN GLAZER OBSERVED several years ago that multiculturalism had become the new civil religion of America, replacing that fusion of pious and rational principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address.

Diana L. Eck, a Harvard religion professor and director of the university's Pluralism Project, gives a popular portrayal of the forms taken by religions imported from Asia and the Middle East in this age of multiculturalism. These are fruits of a political act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965. Eck worships, eats, schmoozes, and eats some more with Hindus, Buddhists, and Muslims in America, showing how the faiths transform and are transformed by American life. "[T]he founding fathers wrote what some have called a 'godless' Constitution, one that deliberately steered away from the establishment of any sect of Christianity, even Christianity itself, as the basis of the new nation." What replaced Christian prima-



cy was "pluralism[,] ... the dynamic process through which we engage with one another in and through our very deepest differences." Thus when the U.S. Army permits Wiccans to be identified as such on their dog tags, we see pluralism working its wonders.

Eck could not have foreseen how problematic her thesis is today, post-September 11. "America's vibrant new Muslim communities are here to stay," she writes. "Now more than ever, all Americans need the instructive challenge of the Qur'an: that our differences require us to get to know each other." But this presumes that the immigrant computer-geek from Pakistan and the Harvard professor from Montana know America's first principles. Unfortunately, both the new religions and the new civil religion appear closed to knowing the roots of the old civil religion — which still retains some vitality. Hearing the "Battle Hymn of the Republic" sung in that National Cathedral prayer service proved how much ours is both a Christian nation and a tolerant one, contrary to the apostles of soulless pluralism. —Ken Masugi

***The Vanishing Automobile and Other Urban Myths: How Smart Growth Will Harm American Cities*, by Randal O'Toole. The Thoreau Institute, 560 pages, \$14.95**

DESPITE ITS ECCENTRIC ORGANIZATION AND its focus on Portland, Oregon, O'Toole's collection of essays is the best introduction to urban quality-of-life issues available today. The book serves multiple purposes: It contains 40 short, op-ed length chapters on urban-affairs topics; almost 80 more on "smart-growth myths"; case studies on Portland and other cities; and numerous useful tables of facts, statistics, and websites. The "myths" include the assumption that urban sprawl leads to economic and environmental ills. O'Toole, a much-honored policy analyst with the Oregon-based Thoreau Institute, makes clear how the arrogance of local planners, fueled by a vision of good urban life, has caused local government to be costly, inept, and despotic.

O'Toole points the way toward cities that

pay more attention to the benefits of markets, property rights, citizen awareness, and common sense. Much of his argument is devoted to challenging the advocates of "smart growth" who love public transportation, restrictive zoning practices, and regulation generally.

He has a formidable challenger in the "new urbanists," who have an appealing vision of beauty they wish to see realized in American cities. They disdain "sprawl," monotonous suburbs, boring architecture, and long commuting times. Their desire to re-create elements of small-town America — tree-lined streets, small stores within walking distance, houses with front porches — appeals to frustrated urban dwellers of all political views.

Armed with the confidence of bureaucracy, many new urbanists and smart-growth advocates are perfectly willing to impose their vision on cities through planning commissions and the like — all examples of the Progressive legacy in American politics. In this way, local government, with its non-partisan character, its disregard of political parties and hence of all democratic politics, and its trust in administrative expertise, is today the best example of the success of Progressivism. The American Founding's ideals of limited government (seen in its regard for property rights) and active citizenship might revitalize the cities while dismantling this administrative state. That is the challenge for students of local government today. In a field where Marxist tracts and bureaucratic apologetics abound, O'Toole's book is essential reading. —KM

***Fighting Poverty With Virtue: Moral Reform and America's Urban Poor, 1825-2000*, by Joel Schwartz. Indiana University Press, 376 pages, \$39.95**

POLITICAL THEORIST JOEL SCHWARTZ'S NEW book is required reading for anyone seriously concerned with the poor. It is an elegant example of political philosophy applied to an eminently practical problem. Schwartz explains how early 20th-century moral reformers such as Jane Addams and Walter Rauschenbusch argued against personal moral reformation as an essential part of

overcoming poverty. Virtue's transformation from a responsibility of the individual to a by-product of social policy led eventually to the welfare crisis of the last half-century. Echoing Alexis de Tocqueville, Schwartz concludes that, "the promotion of virtue is not exclusively — perhaps not even primarily — a matter for public policy."

But what place do political obligations have in helping the poor develop as citizens? Perhaps an analogy with Aristotle's democracy, the rule of the many or the poor, might be applicable. Aristotle advised that the poor learn, and practice, virtue by contributing to the common good. The poor today could contribute to military success through participation in the army or navy. In the war on terrorism, any number of informal security functions, such as patrolling strategically important areas, might be performed by our urban poor. In return, their fellow citizens might treat them as equals, capable of assuming responsibility. —KM

***Roots of Freedom: A Primer on Modern Liberty*, by John W. Danford. ISI Books, 227 pages, \$19.95**

POLITICAL THEORIST JOHN DANFORD, A scholar of David Hume and Ludwig Wittgenstein, perceptively examines the roots of modern political freedom — and what threatens them — in his new book. Danford wrote the early drafts of much of this book during the late 1980s in the form of short articles for Radio Free Europe. But readers will find that this series has a use beyond fighting Communism. His primer surveys Greek philosophy, Christianity, feudalism, the Protestant Reformation, and an array of modern thinkers from Machiavelli through Tocqueville and Marx. Danford shows that the fundamental modern principles are individualism, the rule of law, property rights, and moral restraint; their major theorists are John Locke and Adam Smith. Danford emphasizes free societies' need to protect property and the qualities of character that the concern for acquisition creates. But his ultimate concern is liberal education. He concludes his book: "Perhaps, after all, the ancients can be said to have something to contribute to the principles of free societies. If there are to be free societies, there is no substitute for liberal education."

While approving enthusiastically Danford's purposes and this book's adoption as an elementary text, one might quarrel with his portrayal of the division between ancients and moderns. As he explains it, the division leads to a practical problem, namely, how to defend what he calls "liberal commercial societies." "The ills of equality or egalitarianism are probably inevitable in free societies," he writes. But don't these ills reflect the radical assault on the mixture of the pre-modern and modern roots of our freedom by those who have redefined freedom? —KM

Red Terrorism: The End of the Affair

BY CHRISTOPHER C. HARMON

"The Legends of Rita" (Die Stille nach dem Schuss), directed by Volker Schlöndorff; written (in German, with English subtitles) by Wolfgang Kohlhaase and Volker Schlöndorff. Starring Bibiana Beglau (Rita), Martin Wuttke (Hull), Nadja Uhl (Tatjana), Harald Schrott (Andi), Alexander Beyer (Jochen) and Jenny Schily (Friederike). Available on VHS and DVD. (103 minutes, Not Rated)

LIKE A WELL-RESEARCHED HISTORICAL NOVEL, "The Legends of Rita" is almost true. There was no "Rita Vogt," but there were many young women like her who joined the terrorist underground in the early 1970s in Germany, and from their remarkable lives this film has been composed.

Barbara Meyer of the Baader-Meinhof gang was at the end of her teens and lovely, with "the face of an angel," but she was an accomplice to political murder, like Rita.

Gudrun Ensslin joined the gang out of affection for Andreas Baader and because she was a true believer in violent Marxism. When Baader was jailed, she — like Rita — planned the operation that sprung him.

Inge Vielt, a German terrorist using Paris safehouses, did shoot a French cop who dared to ask her why she was riding her motorcycle without a helmet. In this film it is one of Rita's friends who fires the pistol.

Astrid Proll, an excellent car thief and driver for the gang's bank robberies, spoke for terrorists everywhere when she told a reporter years later that they deserved to be seen as idealists: "we were very well-armed social workers." Ms. Proll operated in Paris as well as her native Germany, like the cinematic Rita.

The East German *Stasi* (secret police) did indeed shelter and support German female and male terrorists who had fled Western police. The Baader-Meinhofs, and their descendants called the Red Army Faction, used East Berlin as a transit station between the West, the East Bloc, and the

Middle East with its Palestinian training camps and roiling low intensity conflicts. East German agents could help "militant internationalists" in most of those countries.

Or they could protect them within East Germany, as with terrorists Susanne Albrecht and Inge Vielt, who were covertly immigrated and settled in banal jobs in Dresden and Magdeburg. In this film, "Susanne" is the very name Rita assumes for a new life under communism. She comes to be seen by coworkers as an embarrassingly naive fan of the East German system. And she similarly resembles the real Inge Vielt in being notably unenthused by the democratic movement of the late 1980s, which excited many East German laborers.

"The Legends of Rita" is thus a valuable portrait as well as an entertaining one. Whatever the politics of scriptwriter Wolfgang Kohlhaase, who flourished in the Communist period in East Germany, the film calmly details many essential truths that were once *verboten*. American analysts of the late Cold War used to debate the question: "Does the Communist bloc back terrorism in the West?" This new German movie is one more affirmation atop the maze of papers from police and foreign ministry offices that have poured out of Budapest, Bucharest, Berlin, and Moscow since the Wall fell down. Today, evidence that Communist states helped German and Italian terrorists, various Palestinians, and even Carlos the Jackal is so overwhelming that many U.S. citizens barely recall the old disagreement, while many academics and self-important newsmen like Daniel Schorr want to forget how wrong they were in ridiculing the idea.

Bibiana Beglau plays "Rita." She is a young woman with clear determination but no rage; she is more sober than many of her cohorts. The scene opens in West Germany with her orchestration of the prison breakout of her lover/comrade. Like the Andreas Baader of contemporary history, this male leader frequently raves at the women in the terrorist group and belittles them — from a proper Leftist perspective. In the film, the man soon enough takes up with a different terrorist mistress, but then both die at a police checkpoint.

Rita's attentions thus shift. She devotes herself to being a good worker in her new East German environs, and she makes new friends. They find Rita deeply empathetic, generous, and even quick to cover for their errors. One close friend is a fellow factory hand, female, prone to drink, whose nascent lesbian interests bring even the libertine Rita to draw the line. Next there is a fling and friendship with a lifeguard, the proverbial bronzed beach boy on the Baltic coast. Like other East Germans around Rita,

however, he grows unnerved as her past is uncovered. Average East German citizens seem to think terrorism stupid and immoral. Not so *Stasi* agent "Erwin," our terrorist heroine's manager; he sees the violent German young people as immature, yes, but as anti-capitalist allies deserving protection. Despite Erwin's status as an agent for a totalitarian system, Director Volker Schlöndorff and his screenwriter seem fond of him, as they are of Rita. Well played by Martin Wuttke, Erwin is humane. Whatever the crisis, or however small the concern, he seems to know the best way, and says the right words. Among his duties is helping Rita create her new "legends," the false personal histories that help her fit quietly into successive East German communities for years at a time. By the late 1980s, as that state's moral emptiness gapes and the *Stasi*'s power wanes, agent Erwin displays slightly more loyalty to his pretty charge than to his decrepit government, and he tries to help her escape before lesser men of the "People's Police" grab her for extradition. Other terrorists sheltering in the East are so grabbed, gifts offered up to West Germany in the act of reunification.

Erwin and Rita might have realized that they represent two kinds of political failure, both radically undemocratic. But more in Marxist character, they see themselves as unfortunates "swept up by history," and together "caught between East and West." Each must now promise to forget knowing the other; each must forge a new legend to escape democratic authorities. That careful advice is the *Stasi* man's last, and he fades quietly from the scene. Rita makes a less skillful, more dramatic exit. But ever the "idealist" and "the good terrorist," she goes out without having personally shot anyone.

Most of Germany's 82 million people today are grateful things ended as they did: Urban guerrilla warfare lost; the open civil society won. What was largely evil gave way to what is largely good. The creators of "The Legends of Rita" are not fully reconciled to this obvious truth, and this is their voice, speaking out from center-left, to slightly shape the past as it recedes.

But they tell a fine story. There are a hundred accurate details in this picture, all visible beneath the subtle rose tinting. The last frame, before the credits roll, declares with some truth: "That's exactly how it was, more or less."

Christopher Harmon is the author of *Terrorism Today* (Frank Cass). His research for this essay is indebted to Eileen MacDonald's *Shoot the Women First*, published by Random House in 1991.

WAR

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 11

tence, dissuade and discourage potential adversaries from investing in other hostile capabilities. For example, effective missile defenses discourage potential adversaries from investing in ballistic missiles that threaten U.S. and allied population centers. The United States also needs to strengthen the capability to deter future adversaries by increasing the capability of its forward-deployed forces and global striking power to respond rapidly to threats. Finally, it must maintain the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression in critical regions.

To do this, the Defense Department will need forces and capabilities that give the president an even wider range of military options. Implementing such a multi-layered deterrence and defense strategy

requires improved intelligence capabilities, long-distance force projection, integrated joint forces, and a credible offensive nuclear deterrent. It also requires a transformation of U.S. forces. Long-time Defense Department official Andrew Marshall notes in his analysis that military transformation is about more than technology. It is about innovative concepts of operating and configuring U.S. forces, and adjustments in how the Department of Defense trains and bases people and materiel and how it conducts day-to-day business. The goal of transformation is to maintain a substantial advantage over any would-be adversaries in key areas such as information warfare, power projection, space, and intelligence. If the United States can do this, it can reduce its own chances of being surprised, and increase its ability to create surprises of its own.

To realize the vision of the QDR, Rumsfeld must now make the hard choices and move money. He must promote those who support the new way of thinking and get rid of those who do not. Of course, thoughtful words and sound strategy in the Pentagon must be matched with decisive action in the field. "Every great army has a soul," historian Victor Davis Hanson once observed. "It is nourished on military competence along with success; but without an identity and élan it eventually starves ... In the coming crucible, the nation's real benefactors may prove the most odious to organization and bureaucracy ... We do not require 'A' students with impressive recommendations, but scrappers who have been overlooked amid the order and routine of the past — the more eager and desperate the better — who know opportunity and fate are not ordained, but fleeting and of the moment."

These various elements of defense policy, military strategy, operational art, and field leadership must come together in Afghanistan and beyond. President Bush has correctly argued that the war in which we now find ourselves will be fought on many fronts, most of them outside the arena of armed combat, and in association with many other nations. But here is a sobering thought: every other member of the so-called anti-terrorist coalition can contribute in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence gathering, public diplomacy, critical infrastructure protection, border security, and the like. But only one nation can project serious and sustained military power anywhere on the globe, and destroy its enemies and their instruments of terror. If we fail in that, all the rest ultimately won't matter.

Patrick J. Garrity is a senior fellow of the Claremont Institute.

Bourbon, Neat

BY WALKER PERCY

THIS IS NOT WRITTEN BY A CONNOISSEUR OF Bourbon. Ninety-nine percent of Bourbon drinkers know more about Bourbon than I do. It is about the aesthetic of Bourbon drinking in general and in particular of knocking it back neat.

I can hardly tell one Bourbon from another, unless the other is very bad. Some bad Bourbons are even more memorable than good ones. For example, I can recall being broke with some friends in Tennessee and deciding to have a party and being able to afford only two-fifths of a \$1.75 Bourbon call Two Natural, whose label showed dice coming up 5 and 2. Its taste was memorable. The psychological effect was also notable. After knocking back two or three shots over a period of half an hour, the three male drinkers looked at each other and said in a single voice: "Where are the women?"

I have not been able to locate this remarkable Bourbon since.

Not only should connoisseurs of Bourbon not read this article, neither should persons preoccupied with the perils of alcoholism, cirrhosis, esophageal hemorrhage, cancer of the palate, and so forth — all real enough dangers. I, too, deplore these afflictions. But, as between these evils and the aesthetic of Bourbon drinking, that is, the use of Bourbon to warm the heart, to reduce the anomie of the late twentieth century, to cut the cold phlegm of Wednesday afternoons, I choose the aesthetic. What, after all, is the use of not having cancer, cirrhosis, and such, if a man comes home from work every day at five-thirty to the exurbs of Montclair or Memphis and there is the grass growing and the little family looking not quite at him but just past the side of his head, and there's Cronkite on the tube and the smell of pot roast in the living room, and inside the house and outside in the pretty exurb has settled the noxious particles and the sadness of the old dying Western world, and him thinking: "Jesus, is this it? Listening to Cronkite and the grass growing?"

If I should appear to be suggesting that such a man proceed as quickly as possible to anesthetize his cerebral cortex by ingesting ethyl alcohol, the point is being missed. Or part of the point. The joy of Bourbon drinking is not the pharmacological effect of the C_2H_5OH on the cortex but rather the instant of the whiskey being knocked back and the little explosion of Kentucky U.S.A. sunshine in the cavity of the nasopharynx and the hot bosky bite of Tennessee summertime — aesthetic considerations to which the effect of the alcohol is, if not dispensable, at least secondary.

The pleasure of knocking back Bourbon lies in the plane of the aesthetic but at an opposite pole from connoisseurship. My preference for the former is or is not deplorable depending on one's value system — that is to say, how ones balances out the Epicurean virtues of cultivating one's sensory end organs with the greatest discrimination and at least cost to one's health, against the virtue of evocation of time and memory and the recovery of self and the past from the fogged-in disoriented Western world. In Kierkegaardian terms, the use of Bourbon to such an end is a kind of aestheticized religious mode of existence, whereas connoisseurship, the discriminating but single-minded stimulation of sensory end organs, is the aesthetic of damnation.

Two exemplars of the two aesthetics come to mind:

Imagine Clifton Webb, scarf at throat, sitting at Cap d'Antibes on a perfect day, the little wavelets of the Mediterranean sparkling in the sunlight, and he is savoring



a 1959 Mouton Rothschild.

Then imagine William Faulkner, having finished *Absalom, Absalom!*, drained, written out, pissed-off, feeling himself over the edge and out of it, nowhere, but he goes somewhere, his favorite hunting place in the Delta wilderness of the Big Sunflower River and, still feeling bad with his hunting cronies and maybe even a little phony, which he was, what with him trying to pretend that he was one of them, a farmer, hunkered down in the cold and rain after the hunt, after honorable passing up the does and seeing no bucks, shivering and snot-nosed, takes out a flat pint of any Bourbon at all and flatfoots about a third of it. He shivers again but not from the cold.

Bourbon does for me what the piece of cake did for Proust.

1926: As a child watching my father in Birmingham, in the exurbs, living next to number-6 fairway of the New Country Club, him disdaining both the bathtub gin and white lightning of the time, aging his own Bourbon in a charcoal keg, on his hands and knees in the basement sucking on a siphon, a matter of gravity requiring cheek pressed against cement floor, the siphon getting going, the decanter ready, the first hot spurt in his mouth not spat out.

1933: My uncle's sun parlor in the Mississippi Delta and toddies on a Sunday afternoon, the prolonged and meditative tinkle of silver spoon against crystal to dissolve the sugar; talk, tinkle, talk; the talk mostly political: "Roosevelt is doing a good job; no, the son of a bitch is betraying his class."

1934: Drinking at a Delta dance, the boys in bi-swing jackets and tab collars, tough-talking and profane and also scared of the girls and therefore safe in the men's room. Somebody passes around bootleg Bourbon in a Coke bottle. It's awful. Tears start from eyes, faces turn red. "Hot damn, that's good!"

1935: Drinking at a football game in college. UNC versus Duke. One has a blind date. One is lucky. She is beautiful. Her clothes are the color of the fall leaves and her face turns up like a flower. But what to say to her, let alone what to do, and whether she is "nice" or "hot" — a distinction made in those days. But what to say? Take a drink, by now from a proper concave hip flask (a long way from the Delta Coke bottle) with a hinged top. Will she have a drink? No. But it's all right. The taste of the Bourbon (Cream of Kentucky) and the smell of her fuse with the brilliant Carolina fall and the sounds of the crowd and the hit of the linemen in single synthesis.

1941: Drinking mint juleps, famed Southern Bourbon drink, though in the Deep South not really drunk much. In fact, they are drunk so seldom that when, say, on Derby Day somebody gives a julep party, people drink them like cocktails, forgetting that a good julep holds at least five ounces of Bourbon. Men fall face-down unconscious, women wander in the woods disconsolate and amnesic, full of thoughts of Kahlil Gibran and the limberlost.

Would you believe the first mint julep I had I was sitting not on a columned porch but in the Boo Snooker bar of the New Yorker Hotel with a Bellevue nurse in 1941? The nurse, a nice upstate girl, head floor nurse, brisk, swift, good-looking; Bellevue nurses, the best in the world and this one the best of Bellevue, at least the best-looking. The julep, an atrocity, a heavy syrupy Bourbon and water in a small glass clotted with ice. But good!

How could two women be more different than the beautiful languid Carolina girl and this swift handsome girl from Utica, best Dutch stock? One thing was sure. Each was to be courted, loved, drunk with, with Bourbon. I should have stuck with Bourbon. We changed to gin fizzes because the bartender said he came from New Orleans and could make good ones. He could and did. They were delicious. What I didn't know was that they were made with raw egg albumen and I was allergic to it. Driving her home to Brooklyn and being in love! What a lovely fine strapping smart girl! And thinking of being invited into her apartment where she lived alone and here offering to cook a little supper and of the many kisses and the sweet love that already existed between us and was bound to grow apace, when on the Brooklyn Bridge itself my upper lip began to swell and little sparks of light flew past the corner of my eye like St. Elmo's fire. In the space of thirty seconds my lip stuck out a full three-quarter inch, like a shelf, like Mortimer Snerd. Not only was kissing out of the question but my eyes swelled shut. I made it across the bridge, pulled over to the curb, and fainted. Whereupon this noble nurse drove me back to Bellevue, gave me a shot, and put me to bed.

Anybody who monkeys around with gin and egg white deserves what he gets. I should have stuck with Bourbon and have from that day to this.

* POSTSCRIPT: Reader, just in case you don't want to knock it back straight and would rather monkey around with perfectly good Bourbon, here's my favorite recipe, "Cud'n Walker's Uncle Will's Favorite Mint Julep Receipt."

You need excellent Bourbon whiskey; rye or Scotch will not do. Put half an inch of sugar in the bottom of the glass and merely dampen it with water. Next, very quickly — and here is the trick in the procedure — crush your ice, actually powder it, preferably in a towel with a wooden mallet, so quickly that it remains dry, and, slipping two sprigs of fresh mint against the inside of the glass, cram the ice in right to the brim, packing it with your hand. Finally, fill the glass, which apparently has no room left for anything else, with Bourbon, the older the better, and grate a bit of nutmeg on the top. The glass will frost immediately. Then settle back in your chair for half an hour of cumulative bliss.

Walker Percy (1916-1990) authored several novels, including *The Movie Goer* (1961) and *The Second Coming* (1980). Excerpts from "Bourbon" from "Life in the South" from *Signposts in a Strange Land* by Walker Percy. Copyright © 1991 by Mary Bernice Percy. Reprinted by permission of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, LLC.

VICTORY

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dependent on Israel itself for most basic services, from money and electricity to telecommunications, water, food, and fuel. Moreover, the PLA's key people are a few minutes' driving distance from Israeli forces. A cutoff of essentials, followed by a military cordon and an invasion, would net all but a few of these terrorists. The U.S. could not dictate how they should be disposed of. But it would make sense for Israel to follow the formula that they deserve death for the harm these criminal gangs have done to everyone with whom they have come in contact, even one another. With the death of the PLO's gangsters, Palestinian politics would be liberated from the culture of assassination that has stunted its healthy growth since the days of Mufti Hussein in the 1920s.

After Iraq and Palestine, it would be Syria's turn. By this time, the seriousness of America and its allies would speak for itself. A declaration of war against the Assad regime by the U.S., Israel, and Turkey would most likely produce a palace coup in Damascus — by one part of the regime eager to save itself by selling out the others — followed by a revolution in the country. At that point, the Allies might produce a list of persons who would have to be handed over to avert an invasion. And of course Syrian troops would have to leave Lebanon. Americans have no interest in Syria strong enough to require close supervision of successors to Assad. But Turkey's interest might require such supervision. The U.S. should make no objection to Turkey's reestablish-

ment of a sphere of influence over parts of its former empire.

Destroying the major anti-Western regimes in the Middle East might come too late to save the moribund government of Saudi Arabia from the anti-Western sentiments that it has shortsightedly fostered within itself. Or the regime might succumb anyway to long-festering quarrels within the royal family. In any case, it is possible that as a consequence of the Saudi regime's natural death, the foreigners who actually extract and ship the oil might be endangered. In that case, we would have to choose among three options: 1) letting the oil become the tool of whoever might win the struggle (and taking the chance that the fields might be sabotaged in the war); 2) trying to build a new Saudi regime to our liking; or 3) taking over protection of the fields. The first amounts to entrusting the world's economy to the vagaries of irresponsible persons. The second option should be rejected because Americans cannot govern Arabs, or indeed any foreigners. Taking over the oil fields alone would amount to colonial conquest — alien to the American tradition. It would not be alien, however, to place them under joint international supervision — something that Russia might well be eager to join.

Our Own Worst Enemies?

WHAT STANDS IN THE WAY OF OUR achieving the peace we so desire? Primarily, the ideas of Western elites. Here are a few.

Violence and killing do not settle anything. In fact they are the ultima ratio, the decisive

argument, on earth. Mankind's great questions are decided by war. The battle of Salamis decided whether or not there would be Greek civilization. Whether Western Europe would be Christian or Muslim was decided by the battle of Tours. Even as the U.S. Civil War decided the future of slavery and World War II ended Nazism, so this war will decide not just who rules in the Middle East, but the character of life in America as well.

Our primary objective in war as in peace must be to act in accordance with the wishes and standards of the broadest slice of mankind. In fact, the standards of most of mankind are far less worthy than those prevalent in America. America's Founders taught this, and forgetting it has caused harm. Alliances must always be means, never ends in themselves, and as such must be made or unmade according to whether or not they help secure our interest. Our interest in war is our kind of peace. That is why it is mistaken to consider as an ally anyone who impedes the killing of those who stand in the way of our peace. With allies like Saudi Arabia, America does not need enemies.

When involved in any conflict, we should moderate the pursuit of our objectives so as propitiate those moderates who stand on the sidelines. Individuals and governments stand on the sidelines of conflict, or lend support to one side, according to their judgment of who will win and with whom they will have to deal. "Extremist" is one of many pejorative synonyms for "loser." The surest way to lose the support of "moderates" is to be ineffective. Might is

mistaken for right everywhere, but especially in the Middle East. Hence the easiest way to encourage terrorism is to attempt to deal with "the root causes of resentment against us" by granting some of the demands of our enemies.

Learning to put up with security measures will make us safer, and is a contribution we can all make to victory. On the contrary, security measures will not make us safe, and accustoming ourselves to them is our contribution to defeat. The sign of victory over terrorism will be the removal of security measures.

The Arab regimes that are the matrices of terrorism have nothing going for them except such Western shibboleths. Their peoples hate them. Their armies would melt before ours as they have melted before Western armies since the days of Xenophon's Upcountry March. They produce nothing. Terror is their domestic policy and their foreign policy.

The regimes that are killing us and defeating us are the product of Western judgments in the mid-20th century that colonialism is wrong and that these peoples could govern themselves as good stewards of the world's oil markets. They continue to exist only because Western elites have judged that war is passé.

It is these ideas and judgments, above all, that stand in the way of our peace, our victory.

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